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• Issues And Arguments
• Feminism Issues And Arguments

Objectification is a notion central to feminist theory. It can beroughly defined as the seeing and/or treating a person, usually awoman, as an object. In this entry, the focus is primarily onsexual objectification, objectification occurring in the sexual realm.Martha Nussbaum (1995, 257) has identified seven features that areinvolved in the idea of treating a person as an object:

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1. instrumentality: the treatment of a person as a tool forthe objectifier's purposes;
2. denial of autonomy: the treatment of a person as lackingin autonomy and self-determination;
3. inertness: the treatment of a person as lacking inagency, and perhaps also in activity;
4. fungibility: the treatment of a person as interchangeablewith other objects;
5. violability: the treatment of a person as lacking inboundary-integrity;
6. ownership: the treatment of a person as something that isowned by another (can be bought or sold);
7. denial of subjectivity: the treatment of a person assomething whose experiences and feelings (if any) need not be takeninto account.

Rae Langton (2009, 228–229) has added three more features toNussbaum's list:

8. reduction to body: the treatment of a person asidentified with their body, or body parts;
9. reduction to appearance: the treatment of aperson primarily in terms of how they look, or how they appear to thesenses;
10. silencing: the treatment of a person as if they aresilent, lacking the capacity to speak.

The majority of the thinkers discussing objectification have taken itto be a morally problematic phenomenon. This is particularly the casein feminist discussions of pornography. Anti-pornography feministsCatharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, influenced by Immanuel Kant'sconception of objectification, have famously argued that, due to men'sconsumption of pornography, women as a group are reduced to the statusof mere tools for men's purposes. Moreover, feminists like Sandra Bartky andSusan Bordo have argued that women are objectified through being excessivelypreoccupied with their appearance. Important recent work by feministshas also been devoted to exploring the connection between objectivityand objectification. More recently, some thinkers, such as MarthaNussbaum, have challenged the idea that objectification is anecessarily negative phenomenon, arguing for the possibility ofpositive objectification. While treating a person as an object (in oneor more of the ways mentioned above) is often problematic, Nussbaumargues that objectification can in some contexts take benign or evenpositive forms, and can constitute a valuable and enjoyable part ofour lives. In her forthcoming work, Nancy Bauer questions the veryidea that it makes sense to specify the marks and features of the term‘objectification’. Such an attempt, she argues, will only distort thephenomenon in question (2015, forthcoming).

1. Kant on sexuality and objectification

Immanuel Kant's views on sexual objectification have been particularlyinfluential for contemporary feminist discussions on this topic. Kantthought that sexuality is extremely problematic when exercised outsidethe context of monogamous marriage, arguing that in such instances itleads to objectification. He characteristically writes inthe Lectures on Ethics that “sexual love makes of theloved person an Object of appetite; as soon as that appetite has beenstilled, the person is cast aside as one casts away a lemon which hasbeen sucked dry. … as soon as a person becomes an Object ofappetite for another, all motives of moral relationship cease tofunction, because as an Object of appetite for another a personbecomes a thing and can be treated and used as such by everyone” (Kant Lectures on Ethics, 163).

Objectification, for Kant, involves the lowering of a person, a beingwith humanity, to the status of an object. Humanity, forKant, is an individual's rational nature and capacity for rationalchoice. The characteristic feature of humanity is an individual'scapacity for rationally setting and pursuing her own ends. A beingwith humanity is capable of deciding what is valuable, and of findingways to realise and promote this value. Humanity is what is specialabout human beings. It distinguishes them from animals and inanimateobjects. Because human beings are special in this sense they have,unlike animals and objects, a dignity (an ‘innerworth’, as opposed to a ‘relative worth’) (Kant1785, 42). It is crucial, for Kant, that each person respects humanityin others, as well as humanity in their own person. Humanity mustnever be treated merely as a means, but always at the same time as anend (Kant 1797, 209).

Kant is worried that when people exercise their sexuality outside thecontext of monogamous marriage, they treat humanity merely as a meansfor their sexual purposes. In the Lectures on Ethics Kantoften speaks about ‘degradation’,‘subordination’, and ‘dishonouring’ ofhumanity when exercise of sexuality is involved. He goes so far as tosay that sexual activity can lead to the loss or‘sacrifice’ of humanity (Kant Lectures on Ethics,163–4). The loved person loses what is special to her as a humanbeing, her humanity, and is reduced to a thing, a mere sexualinstrument. Kant's notion of objectification, therefore, focuseslargely on instrumentality: the treatment of a person as a mere toolfor the lover's purposes. Objectification, for Kant, involvesregarding someone “as an object, something for use”(Herman 1993, 57). According to Alan Soble, for Kant, “both thebody and the compliant actions of the other person are tools (a means)that one uses for one's sexual pleasure, and to that extent the otherperson is a fungible, functional thing” (Soble 2002a, 226). Theidea that within sexual relationships people are reduced to objects,that they lose their rational nature, is an extreme one. Halwanirightly points out that this reduction to the status of an objectrarely happens in sexual objectification. He explains that“Outside rape, it is rare to treat our sexual partners asobjects: not only are we aware of their humanity; we are also mindfulof it.” (Halwani 2010, 193) Halwani offers a more sensiblereading of Kant's claim here, in admitting that there is truth to theidea that “Sexual desire is powerful enough to make reason itsown tool; it can subvert our rational capacity to set ends”(Halwani 2010, 209). In this way, people can “endanger theirdignity by undermining their reason” (Halwani 2010,209). Therefore, even though the view that humanity is completelydestroyed when people exercise their sexuality is an unappealing one,it is not unreasonable to think that, in some cases, sexual desire andexercise of sexuality can undermine our rationality.

Kant thought that in theory both men and women can be objectified,but he was well aware that in practice women are the most commonvictims of objectification. This is obvious in Kant's discussionsof prostitution and concubinage. Exercise of sexuality within thesemorally problematic sexual contexts leads to the reduction of women(prostitutes and concubines) to men's objects of appetite.

Kant defines prostitution as the offer for profit of one'sperson for another's sexual gratification. A person, Kant holds,cannot allow others to use her body sexually in exchange for moneywithout losing her humanity and becoming an object. He explains that“… a man is not at his own disposal. He is not entitledto sell a limb, not even one of his teeth. But to allow one's personfor profit to be used for the satisfaction of sexual desire, to makeof oneself an Object of demand, is to dispose over oneself as over athing” (Kant Lectures on Ethics, 165). The prostitute'scommodification necessarily leads to her objectification; she isreduced to “a thing on which another satisfies hisappetite” (Kant Lectures on Ethics, 165). Kant statesthat “human beings are … not entitled to offerthemselves, for profit, as things for the use of others in thesatisfaction of their sexual inclinations. In so doing, they would runthe risk of having their person used by all and sundry as aninstrument for the satisfaction of inclination”(Kant Lectures on Ethics, 165). Kant blames the prostitutefor her objectification. He takes her to be responsible forsacrificing her humanity, in offering herself as an object for thesatisfaction of the clients' sexual desires.

The other relationship in which objectification is, for Kant, clearlypresent is concubinage. According to Kant, concubinage is thenon-commodified sexual relationship between a man and more than onewoman (the concubines). Kant takes concubinage to be a purely sexualrelationship in which all parties aim at the satisfaction of theirsexual desires (Kant Lectures on Ethics, 166). The inequalitythat is involved in this relationship makes it problematic. Kantexplains that “the woman surrenders her sex completely to theman, but the man does not completely surrender his sex to thewoman” (Kant Lectures on Ethics, 169). Since body andself are for Kant inseparable and together they constitute the person,in surrendering her body (her sex) exclusively to her male partner,the woman surrenders her whole person to the man, allowing him topossess it. The man, by contrast, who has more than one sexualpartner, does not exclusively surrender himself to the woman, and sohe does not allow her to possess his person. In allowing her malepartner to possess her person, without herself being able to similarlypossess his person, Kant believes that eventually the concubine (andthis also applies to the woman in any other polygamous relationship,including polygamous marriage) loses her person and is made‘into a thing’ (Kant Lectures on Ethics,166).

The only relationship in which two people can exercise theirsexuality without the fear of reducing themselves to objects ismonogamous marriage. Monogamy is required to ensurethat there is equality and reciprocity in the surrender and ownershipof the two spouses' persons. The spouses exclusively surrender theirpersons to one another, so neither of them is in danger of losing hisor her person and becoming an object. This perfect equality andreciprocity between the spouses is described by Kant as follows:“… if I yield myself completely to another and obtain theperson of the other in return, I win myself back; I have given myselfup as the property of another, but in turn I take that other as myproperty, and so win myself back again in winning the person whoseproperty I have become. In this way, the two persons become a unity ofwill” (Kant Lectures on Ethics, 167). Furthermore, thismutual exchange of the two spouses' persons must, for Kant,be legally enforced. Kant explains that marriage is“sexual union in accordance with law” (Kant 1797, 62). Hewants something external, the law, to guarantee this lifelongownership of the two parties' persons in marriage. He argues that thislegal obligation to surrender one's person to one's spouses makesmarriage different from a monogamous relationship between twounmarried partners.

2. Pornography and objectification

Like Kant, anti-pornography feminists Catharine MacKinnon and AndreaDworkin take inequality to be tightly linked to objectification. Inthe eyes of both these feminists and Kant, there is the powerfulobjectifier on the one hand, and on the other hand there exists hispowerless victim. Due to their unequal power, the former objectifiesthe latter.

Kant is concerned with inequality taking place within polygamousrelationships. MacKinnon and Dworkin, on the other hand, believe thatinequality is a much more widespread and pervasive phenomenon. Itcovers all aspects of our society. MacKinnon and Dworkin emphasise thatwe live in a world of gender inequality. A person'sgender is, for MacKinnon, clearly distinguished from aperson's sex. Gender, being a man or a woman, is sociallyconstructed, whereas sex, being male or female, is biologicallydefined. Within our patriarchal societies, men and women have clearlydefined roles: women (all women, women as a group) are objectified,whereas men (all men, men as a group) are their objectifiers(MacKinnon 1987, 6, 32–45, 50; MacKinnon 1989a, 113–4, 128,137–40; Haslanger 1993, 98–101) (For more on sex andgender, see also the entries feminist perspectives on sex and gender and feminist perspectives on power.Even though MacKinnon does acknowledge that a female (sex) individual canbe an objectifier and a male (sex) individual can be objectified, shetakes it that the former is a man and the latter is a woman, since inher view a man (gender) is by definition the objectifier and a woman(gender) is by definition the objectified.

This situation of gender inequality which troubles our societies andis so tightly linked to the objectification of women is, MacKinnon andDworkin believe, created and sustained by men's consumption ofpornography. Mackinnon defines pornography as “the graphicsexually explicit subordination of women though pictures or words thatalso includes women dehumanised as sexual objects, things, orcommodities; enjoying pain or humiliation or rape; being tied up, cutup, mutilated, bruised, or physically hurt; in postures of sexualsubmission or servility or display; reduced to body parts, penetratedby objects or animals, or presented in scenarios of degradation,injury, torture; shown as filthy or inferior; bleeding, bruised, orhurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual” (MacKinnon1987, 176).

In our society, MacKinnon holds, pornography defines women'srole as sexual objects available for men's consumption:“Pornography defines women by how we look according to how we canbe sexually used. … Pornography participates in itsaudience's eroticism through creating an accessible sexualobject, the possession and consumption of which is malesexuality, as socially constructed; to be consumed and possessed aswhich, is female sexuality, as socially constructed”(MacKinnon 1987, 173). According to MacKinnon, pornography isresponsible for both men's and women's conception of womenas objects available for men's consumption.

MacKinnon and Dworkin's understanding of objectification issimilar to Kant's. For both of them, like for Kant,objectification involves treating a person, someone with humanity, asan object of merely instrumental worth, and consequently reducing thisperson to the status of an object for use. The objectified individualis made into a tool for others' sexual purposes. Objectification,therefore, constitutes a serious harm to a person's humanity.

Dworkin uses Kantian language to describe the phenomenon of sexualobjectification: “Objectification occurs when a human being,through social means, is made less than human, turned into a thing orcommodity, bought and sold. When objectification occurs, a person isdepersonalised, so that no individuality or integrity is availablesocially or in what is an extremely circumscribed privacy.Objectification is an injury right at the heart of discrimination:those who can be used as if they are not fully human are no longerfully human in social terms; their humanity is hurt by beingdiminished” (Dworkin 2000, 30–1). When a person istreated as less than human, as merely an object for another's use, shebecomes, according to Dworkin, less than human. In this way, herhumanity is harmed by being diminished.

MacKinnon too describes objectification is similar terms. She writes:“… A sex object is defined on the basis of its looks, interms of its usability for sexual pleasure, such that both thelooking—the quality of gaze, including its points ofview—and the definition according to use become eroticised aspart of the sex itself. This is what the feminist concept of‘sex object’ means” (MacKinnon 1987, 173). Shefurthermore holds: “A person, in one Kantian view, is a free andrational agent whose existence is an end in itself, as opposed toinstrumental. In pornography women exist to the end of malepleasure” (MacKinnon 1987, 173). Insofar as an individual hasonly instrumental value, she is clearly not regarded as an end inherself.

MacKinnon and Dworkin have argued that, even if women consent to theirbeing used as mere means for men's sexual purposes, this is notsufficient to make such use permissible. For instance, these feministsclaim that women in the pornographic industry consent to be used asobjects simply out of lack of options available to them within ourpatriarchal society. Women's consent, therefore, is not trueconsent. MacKinnon writes: “The sex is not chosen for the sex.Money is the medium of force and provides the cover of consent”(Mackinnon 1993, 28). This does not only hold for women inpornography. For MacKinnon and Dworkin, all women's consent to besexually used by men cannot be true consent under the existingconditions of gender inequality. They hold that women are not trulyblameworthy for their reduction to things of merely instrumentalvalue. Women's objectification is demanded and inflicted by men inour societies. It is men who want, and also, Dworkin claims, need touse women as objects, and demand them to be object-like (Dworkin 1997,142–3).

Kant compares the objectified individual to a lemon, used anddiscarded afterwards, and elsewhere to a steak consumed by people forthe satisfaction of their hunger (Kant Lectures on Ethics,163 and 165). In a similar manner, MacKinnon blames pornography forteaching its consumers that women exist to be used by men. A woman,according to MacKinnon, becomes comparable to a cup (a thing), and assuch she is valued only for how she looks and how she can be used(MacKinnon 1987, 138). Similarly, Dworkin talks about men being theonly “human centre” of the world, surrounded by objectsfor use, including women. A man experiences his power, according toDworkin, in using objects, both inanimate objects and “personswho are not adult men” (Dworkin 1989, 104).

Kant took exercise of sexuality to be inherently problematic. ForDworkin and MacKinnon, on the other hand, what is problematic is notsexuality per se, but rather sexuality as constructed throughpornography. These feminists believe that objectification is aconsequence of gender inequality and it is created and sustained bypornography's existence and consumption. Pornography, according toMacKinnon, makes women's sexuality into “something any man whowants to can buy and hold in his hands… She becomes somethingto be used by him, specifically, an object of his sexual use”(MacKinnon 1987, 138). MacKinnon fears that use can easily be followedby violence and abuse. Since women are things (as opposed to humanbeings), it seems to men that there is nothing problematic withabusing them. The object status of women, then, is the cause of menseeing nothing problematic with violent behaviour towards women.

Moreover, MacKinnon notes, women in pornography are presented asenjoying how they are being used and violated by men: “Inpornography, women desire disposition and cruelty. Men … createscenes in which women desperately want to be bound, battered,tortured, humiliated, and killed. Or merely taken and used. Women arethere to be violated and possessed, men to violate and possessus…” (MacKinnon 1987, 148). Dworkin similarly writes:“Men do not believe that rape and battery are violations offemale will in part because men … have consumed pornography inthe private world of men for centuries. … The most enduringsexual truth in pornography is that sexual violence is desired by thenormal female, needed by her, suggested or demanded by her”(Dworkin 1989, 166). Pornography, then, teaches its consumers that,not only is it permissible to treat women in these ways, but also thatwomen themselves enjoy being used, violated and abused by men.

The idea that pornography causes men to treat women asobjects to be used and abused has been defended by a number offeminists. Alison Assiter argues that what is wrong with pornographyis that it reinforces desires on the part of men to treat women asobjects (as mere means to achieve their purposes) (Assiter 1988,68). Rae Langton also discusses the possibility of such a causalconnection between men's consumption of pornography and women'sobjectification. She writes: “As a matter of human psychology,when men sexually use objects, pornographic artifacts, as women, theytend to use real woman as objects. One weaker variant of this causalclaim might be restricted to a subset of pornography… As amatter of human psychology, when men sexually use objects as women,and those objects are pornographic artifacts, whose content isviolent or misogynistic, then they will tend to use real women asobjects” (Langton 1995, 178).)

MacKinnon, however, holds that the connection between men'suse of pornography and women's objectification is not simply acausal one. She has famously claimed that pornography involves“sex between people and things, human beings and pieces of paper,real men and unreal women”. And, as a result for MacKinnon,“the human [women, in particular] becomes a thing”(MacKinnon 1993, 109 and 25). Men's consumption of pornography,then, is (constitutes) women's objectification.(This is admittedly a puzzling claim, but one which I will not delveinto further here. Detailed defenses of the claim have beenoffered by Melinda Vadas (Vadas 2005) and Rae Langton (Langton 1995),and a criticism has been put forward by Jennifer Saul (Saul 2006).)

Kant thought that the solution to sexual objectification ismarriage. This is because he conceived this relationship as one ofperfect equality and reciprocity between the spouses. Each of themsurrenders his or her person to the other and receives the person ofthe other in return. This way, Kant believed, neither of them isobjectified by losing his or her person (For a detailed discussion ofKantian marriage see Herman 1993 and Papadaki 2010b.). For Dworkin andMacKinnon, however, Kant's suggested solution isinappropriate. Objectification, according to these feminists, ispresent within all heterosexual relationships in our society and harmswomen's humanity. Marriage, or any other heterosexual relationship forthat matter, is clearly not regarded as an exception bythem. According to MacKinnon and Dworkin, the way to fightobjectification is to fight gender inequality, which is created andsustained by men's consumption of pornography. They take it thatpornography has power and authority over its audience (men andboys). This view is also defended by Langton, who argues that it doesnot matter that the speech of pornographers is not generally held inhigh esteem. What matters, rather, is that men and boys learn aboutsex primarily through pornography. Pornography passes the message toits audience that women are objects readily available for men'sconsumption (Langton 1993, 312).

The view that pornography has this amount of influence over men andplays such a central role in women's objectification has receivedcriticism. Deborah Cameron and Elizabeth Frazer question the idea thatmen are conditioned to behave in certain ways as a consequence ofpornography consumption. What is problematic with this idea, accordingto them, is that men are presented as incapable of criticallyinterpreting pornographic materials, and as simply imitating what theysee in pornography (Cameron & Frazer 2000, 248–251).

Even assuming that pornography does indeed pass the message thatwomen are object-like to its consumers, however, it has been suggestedthat pornography is not special with respect to sustaining genderinequality and women's objectification. Leslie Green explainsthat the idea that women are mere objects/tools is reinforced throughparental pressure, television, popular novels, music videos andfashion. What we need to do, Green says, is change our society, in away that women's subjectivity will be acknowledged (Green 2000,43–52). Nussbaum too argues that we should not see pornography as theprimary cause of women's objectification. Sexual objectificationis, according to Nussbaum, often caused by social inequality, but thereis no reason to believe that pornography is the core of such inequality(Nussbaum 1995, 286, 290).

A similar view has been put forward by Ronald Dworkin, according towhom: “It might be odd that feminists have devoted such energyto that campaign [the campaign for outlawing pornography]… Nodoubt mass culture is in various ways an obstacle to sexual equality,but the most popular forms of that culture—the view of womenpresented in soap operas and commercials, for example—are muchgreater obstacles to that equality than the dirty films watched by asmall minority” (R. Dworkin 1993, 36). (For further discussionsabout pornography, see also the entries on feminist perspectives on sex markets and on pornography and censorship.)

3. Feminine appearance and objectification

It has been pointed out by some feminist thinkers that women in oursociety are more identified and associated with their bodies than aremen, and, to a greater extent than men, they are valued for how theylook (Bordo 1993, 143; Bartky 1990). In order to gain socialacceptability, women are under constant pressure tocorrect their bodies and appearance more generally, andmake them conform to the ideals of feminine appearance of their time,the so-called ‘norms of feminine appearance’ (the standardsof appearance women feel they should be living up to) (Saul2003, 144). Some feminists have argued that, in being preoccupied withtheir looks, women treat themselves as things to be decorated and gazedupon.

In her book Femininity and Domination, Sandra Bartky usesMarx's theory of alienation to explain the objectification thatresults from women's preoccupation with their appearance. Afeature of Marx's theory of alienation is thefragmentation of the human person, this “splintering ofhuman nature into a number of misbegotten parts”. For Marx,labour is the most distinctively human activity, and the product oflabour is the exteriorisation of the worker's being. Under capitalism,however, workers are alienated from the products of their labour, andconsequently their person is fragmented (Bartky 1990,128–9).

Bartky believes that women in patriarchal societies also undergo akind of fragmentation “by being too closely identified with[their body]… [their] entire being is identified with the body,a thing which… has been regarded as less inherently human thanthe mind or personality” (Bartky 1990, 130). All the focus isplaced on a woman's body, in a way that her mind or personality arenot adequately acknowledged. A woman's person, then, isfragmented. Bartky believes that through this fragmentation a woman isobjectified, since her body is separated from her person and isthought as representing the woman (Bartky 1990, 130).

Bartky explains that, typically, objectification involves twopersons, one who objectifies and one who is objectified. (This is alsothe idea of objectification put forward by Kant as well as by MacKinnonand Dworkin.) However, as Bartky points out, objectifier andobjectified can be one and the same person. Women in patriarchalsocieties feel constantly watched by men, much like the prisoners ofthe Panopticon (model prison proposed by Bentham), and they feel theneed to look sensually pleasing to men (Bartky 1990, 65). According toBartky: “In the regime of institutionalised heterosexuality womanmust make herself ‘object and prey’ for the man. …Woman lives her body as seen by another, by an anonymous patriarchalOther” (Bartky 1990, 73). This leads women to objectify theirown persons. Bartky argues that the woman “[takes] toward her ownperson the attitude of the man. She will then take erotic satisfactionin her physical self, revelling in her body as a beautiful object to begazed at and decorated”. Such an attitude is called‘narcissism’, which is defined by Bartky as the infatuationwith one's bodily being (Bartky 1990, 131–2).

In being infatuated with their bodily beings, Bartky argues thatwomen learn to see and treat themselves as objects to be gazed at anddecorated, they learn to see themselves as though from the outside.Narcissism, as Simone de Beauvoir also points out, “consists inthe setting up of the ego as a double ‘stranger’”(Beauvoir 1961, 375). The adolescent girl “becomes an object andshe sees herself as an object; she discovers this new aspect of herbeing with surprise: it seems to her that she has been doubled; insteadof coinciding exactly with herself, she now begins to existoutside” (Beauvoir 1961, 316) (See the entry on Simone de Beauvoir.) However, this‘stranger’ who inhabits women's consciousness, Bartkywrites, is hardly a stranger; it is, rather, the woman's own self(Bartky 1993, 134).

As Nancy Bauer holds, drawing on Beauvoir, women will always havereasons to succumb to the temptation of objectifying themselves. Bauermentions the widespread recent phenomenon of female college studentswho claim that they gain pleasure in performing unilateral oral sex onmale students. A woman who turns herself into an “object of thehelpless desire of a boy”in this way, Bauer explains,experiences a sense of power and pleasure, which, however, are notunadulterated (Bauer 2011, 124). A great theme of The SecondSex, Bauer concludes, is that, in order to achieve fullpersonhood, it is necessary not only that men stop objectifying women,but also that “women care about abjuring the temptation toobjectify themselves” (Bauer 2011, 128).

Bartky talks about the disciplinary practices that produce a femininebody and are the practices through which women learn to see themselvesas objects. First of all, according to her, there are those practicesthat aim to produce a body of a certain size and shape: women mustconform to the body ideal of their time (i.e. a slim body with largebreasts), which, Bartky holds, requires women to subject their bodiesto the ‘tyranny of slenderness’ (put themselves throughconstant dieting and exercise) (Bartky 1990, 65–7). Susan Bordoalso emphasises the fact that women are more obsessed with dietingthan are men. This is linked to serious diseases such as anorexia andbulimia. Ninety percent of all anorexics, Bordo points out, are women (Bordo1993, 143, 154). Furthermore, a large number of women have plasticsurgery, most commonly liposuction and breast enlargement, in order tomake their bodies conform to what is considered to be the idealbody.

According to Bartky, the second category of these disciplinarypractices that produce a feminine body are those that aim to controlthe body's gestures, postures, and movements. Women, she holds,are more restricted than men in the way they move, and they try to takeup very little space as opposed to men, who tend to expand to the spaceavailable. Women's movements are also restrained by theiruncomfortable clothes and shoes (Bartky 1990, 68–9). The finalcategory of the disciplinary practices, Bartky holds, are those that aredirected towards the display of a woman's body as an‘ornamented surface’: women must take care of their skinand make it soft, smooth, hairless and wrinkle-free, they must applymake-up to disguise their skin's imperfections. Our culturedemands the ‘infantilisation’ of women's bodies andfaces (Bartky 1990, 71–2).

According to Bartky: “… whatever else she [awoman] may become, she is importantly a body designed to please or toexcite” (Bartky 1990, 80). Iris Marion Young adds thatwomen's preoccupation with their appearance suppresses the bodypotential of women: “Developing a sense of our bodies asbeautiful objects to be gazed at and decorated requires suppressing asense of our bodies as strong, active subjects…” (Young,1979).

Who is responsible for women's situation? According to Bartky:“The disciplinary power that inscribes femininity in the femalebody is everywhere and it is nowhere; the disciplinarian is everyoneand yet no one in particular” (Bartky 1990, 74). The messagethat women should look more feminine is everywhere: it is reinforced byparents, teachers, male partners, and it is expressed in various waysthroughout the media. Men, then, are not the only ones to blame forwomen's situation. Because of the pervasiveness of thisdisciplinary power that inscribes femininity,women's constant preoccupation with appearance has come to beregarded as something natural and voluntary; it is something that womenhave internalised. Therefore, it is far from easy for women, inBartky's view, to free themselves from their objectification.

Not all feminists, however, share the concern about the inevitabilityof objectification involved in women's appearance-relatedpursuits. Janet Richards takes women's preoccupation with their looksto be a matter of personal preference, and not a feminist matter. Sheclaims that there is nothing inherently degrading or objectifying withwomen trying to be sensually pleasing (Richards 1980,184–204). Natasha Walter too takes it that women's preoccupationwith their appearance is not necessarily objectifying. She also pointsto the fact that men in our societies engage into self-decoration andseek to be admired by women (Walter 1998, 86–102).

Bordo herself acknowledges the fact that men have increasingly startedto spend more time, money and effort on their appearance (Bordo1999). She emphasises the fact that men's magazines today, likewomen's, are full of articles and advice on how men should look: howto be more muscular, what clothes to wear, what creams and othercosmetics to use, etc. Men feel the need to make their looks conformto the prevailing ideals of masculinity. Bordo believes that it isconsumer capitalism that drives men to be increasingly concerned withtheir appearance: “Why should [the cosmetics, diet, exercise,and surgery industries] restrict themselves to female markets, if theycan convince men that their looks need constant improvementtoo?,” she asks (Bordo 1999, 220).

The fact that men too face pressure to look a certain way, andengage in constant efforts to improve their appearance, however, is noton its own sufficient to show that women's (and men's)preoccupation with appearance is not objectifying. According to Saul,“The increasing pressure on men to conform to unattainablestandards of beauty is far from a sign of progress: it is, instead, asign that the problem has grown” (Saul 2003, 168).

4. Objectivity and Objectification

MacKinnon introduced the idea that there are important connectionsbetween objectivity and objectification. MacKinnon writes: “Thestance of the ‘knower’ … is … the neutralposture, which I will be calling objectivity—that is thenonsituated distanced standpoint… [This] is the male standpointsocially … [The] relationship between objectivity as the stancefrom which the world is known and the world that is apprehended inthis way is the relationship of objectification. Objectivity is theepistemological stance of which objectification is the social process,of which male dominance is the politics, the acted out socialpractice. That is, to look at the world objectively is to objectifyit” (MacKinnon 1987, 50). Her claim has become the focus ofrecent feminist investigation. Drawing on MacKinnon's work, RaeLangton and Sally Haslanger have explored the idea thatobjectification is often hidden, and ‘masked’ asobjectivity.

According to Haslanger, in trying to be objective about our world andfunction within it, we go about trying to discover things' natures. Anobject's nature is essential to it, and any change to it willinevitably destroy it. An object cannot exist without those propertiesthat constitute its nature. Discovering an object's nature enables usto explain the behaviour of that object under normalcircumstances. This means that in practical decision-making, we mustbe attentive to objects' natures (Haslanger 1993, 103, 105). Shewrites: “It won't do to try to fry an egg on a paper plate;there is no point in trying to teach a rock how to read. Because theworld is not infinitely malleable to our wants or needs, reasonabledecision making will accommodate ‘how things are’, wherethis is understood as accommodating the natures of things, thebackground conditions constraining our actions” (Haslanger 1993,105).

A plausible strategy for discovering a thing's nature is to look forobserved regularities. This is because natures are responsible for theregular behaviour of things under normal circumstances. For example, Iobserve that my ferns die if deprived of water. I therefore come tobelieve that the nature of ferns is such that they cannot survivewithout water. I adjust my decision-making in accordance with thisobserved regularity, and so water my ferns to prevent them fromdying. In observing the regularity that ferns die when depraved ofwater, I have concluded that this is due to ferns' nature. Haslangerpoints out that this procedure of drawing on observed regularities toset constraints on our practical decision making seems to be “aparadigm of ‘neutral,’ ‘objective,’ or‘reasonable’ procedure” (Haslanger 1993, 105).

The above procedure, however, can be problematic. This becomesobvious when moving to the social world. For example, aiming todiscover women's nature following the above procedure inpatriarchal societies (like ours, according to MacKinnon) is highlyproblematic. MacKinnon believes that it is an observed regularity inour societies that women are submissive and object-like (and men arewomen's objectifiers). This means that one might be led to thebelief that women are by their nature submissive andobject-like. (It should be noted here that MacKinnon, and alsoHaslanger and Langton following her, use ‘men’ and‘women’ to refer to gender categories, which are socially(not biologically) defined: one is a woman or a man by virtue ofone's social position. (See the entry on feminist perspectives on sex and gender.) However, thebelief that women are naturally submissive and object-like is false,since women have been made to be like that.

Women's object-like status is not a natural fact, but rather aconsequence of gender inequality. In structuring our world in such away as to accommodate this allegedly natural fact about women, wesustain the existing situation of gender inequality. As MacKinnonvividly puts it: “if [we] look neutrally on the reality ofgender so produced, the harm that has been done will not beperceptible as harm. It becomes just the way things are”(MacKinnon 1987, 59). Haslanger adds: “Once we have cast womenas submissive and deferential ‘by nature’, then efforts tochange this role appear unmotivated, even pointless. … Thesereflections suggest that what appeared to be a ‘neutral’or ‘objective’ ideal, namely, the procedure of drawing onobserved regularities to set constraints on practical decisionmaking—is one which will, under conditions of gender hierarchyreinforce the social arrangements on which such hierarchy depends”(Haslanger 1993, 106).

Drawing on MacKinnon, Haslanger suggests that there are fourconditions that are necessary in order for person A toobjectify person B:

1. Person Aviews and treats person B asan object for the satisfaction of A's desire;
2. Where person Adesires person B to havesome property, AforcesB to have thatproperty;
3. Person Abelieves that person B hasthat property;
4. Person A believes that person B has thatproperty by nature (Haslanger 1993, 102–3).

When it comes to women's sexual objectification by men, theabove conditions go as following:

1. Men view and treat women as objects of malesexual desire;
2. Men desire women to be submissive andobject-like and force them to submit;
3. Men believe that women are in factsubmissive and object-like;
4. Men believe that women are in factsubmissive and object-like by nature.

According to Haslanger, in order for an objectifier to‘mask’ his power and believe that the observed differencesbetween men and women are consequences of their natures, he must resortto a norm of aperspectivity; he must believe that hisobservations are not conditioned by his own social position, and thathe has no impact on the circumstances under observation. Haslangerdiscusses a norm, which is often used by objectifiers, the norm ofAssumed Objectivity, which consists of the following foursub-norms:

1. Epistemic neutrality: one must take a genuine regularity inthe behaviour of something to be a consequence of its nature.
2. Practical neutrality: one must constrain one's decisionmaking to accommodate things' natures.
3. Absolute aperspectivity: one must count observed regularitiesas “genuine” when: (i) observations occur under normalcircumstances, (ii) observations are not conditioned by theobserver's social position, (iii) the observer has not influencedthe behaviour of items under observation.
4. Assumed aperspectivity: one must believe that any regularityone observes is a “genuine” regularity, and so reveals thenature of the things under observation (Haslanger 1993, 106–7).

Haslanger argues that, under conditions of social hierarchy, theNorm of Assumed Objectivity would perpetuate the existing patterns ofwomen's objectification. Therefore, our efforts at social changewould become unmotivated. The norm in question should be rejected inthis case because it has bad practical consequences for women, whileserving the interests of men (it is pragmatically bad).Furthermore, Haslanger argues that the norm of Assumed Objectivityshould be rejected because it yields false beliefs, like the beliefthat women are submissive and object-like by their nature (it isepistemically bad) (Haslanger 1993, 108–115).

Langton agrees with Haslanger that, under conditions of socialhierarchy, the norm of Assumed Objectivity is problematic and thereforeshould be rejected. Her reasons are twofold: First of all, (asHaslanger also noted) because it yields false beliefs; beliefs which donot fit the world at all, like the belief that women are object-like bynature. Secondly, because it yields true but unjustifiedbeliefs, beliefs that are true “for the wrong reasons”(Langton 1993, 383); for example, the belief that women are actuallysubmissive and object-like. The belief is unjustified, according toLangton, because of its direction of fit. In this case, Langtonexplains, instead of men arranging their belief to fit the world, theworld arranges itself to fit the belief of men. Those people who occupya position of power and pursue the norm of Assumed Objectivity willmake the world conform to their belief (Langton 1993, 383).

Langton explains that objectivity is about the ways inwhich the mind conforms to the world (the way in which our beliefsarrange themselves to fit the world). When someone is objective, his orher beliefs have the right direction of fit: the beliefs are arrangedin order to fit the way the world is. Objectification, on theother hand, is about the ways in which the world conforms to mind(conforms to our beliefs). An objectifier's beliefs have thewrong direction of fit: the objectifier arranges the world in order tofit his or her beliefs, which are influenced by his or her desires,instead of arranging his or her beliefs to fit the way the worldactually is. Objectification, then, is a process in which the socialworld comes to be shaped by desire and belief. An objectifier thinksthat her or his beliefs have come to fit the world, where in fact theworld has come to fit her or his beliefs.

When it comes to the objectification of women, Langton explains thatwomen become submissive and object-like because of men's desires andbeliefs. Men desire women to be this way, and, if they have power,they force women to become this way. Following the norm of AssumedObjectivity, then, men form the belief that women are in factsubmissive and object-like, and also that women are like that due totheir nature. So, when it comes to women's objectification, the worldconforms to men's minds. Men's beliefs, however, have the wrongdirection of fit because men arrange the world to fit their beliefsand desires about women being submissive and object-like. The norm ofAssumed Objectivity, then, yields the belief that women are submissiveand object-like, which is true but has the wrong direction of fit(Langton 2000, 138–142), along with the false belief that womenare naturally this way. (For a further discussion about beliefs withan anomalous direction of fit, as well as a discussion of themechanisms that are responsible for generating them, see alsoLangton's work on ‘projection’ and its role in women'sobjectification in her 2004 article “Projection andObjectification”. For a criticism of Langton's argument that thenorm of Assumed Objectivity is responsible for yielding beliefs thatare true but have a wrong direction of fit, see Papadaki 2008.)

5. The possibility of positive objectification

So far, we have looked at various concerns regarding the wrongnessinvolved in objectification. A number of thinkers, however, havechallenged the idea that objectification is always morallyproblematic.

Alan Soble questions the widely held Kantian view according to whichhuman dignity is something that people have. He argues thatobjectification is not inappropriate. Everyone is already only anobject and being only an object is not necessarily a bad thing. In onesense, then, no one can be objectified because no one has the higherontological status that is required to be reduce-able byobjectification. In another sense, everyone is vulnerable toobjectification, and everyone can and may be objectified, because todo so is to take them to their correct ontological level. He writes:

The claim that we should treat people as‘persons’ and not dehumanise them is to reify, is toanthropomorphise humans and consider them more than they are. Do nottreat people as objects, we are told. Why not? Because, goes theanswer, people qua persons deserve not to be treated as objects. Whata nice bit of illusory chauvinism. People are not as grand as we makethem out to be, would like them to be, or hope them to be. (Soble2002b, 53–4)

In the case of pornography, then, there is nothing wrong, accordingto Soble, with treating pornographic actors and models as objects forsexual pleasure and deny their humanity. That is because there is nonegative objectification that needs to be taken into moralaccount. Soble adds that pornography's task is in fact a good one;pornography takes these people (both men and women), who according tohim are good at sex, and makes sure that they do something with theirlives (Soble 2002b).

Leslie Green is another thinker who argues that it is permissible andalso required to treat people as objects. As Green explains, peopleare embodied, extended in space, they exist in time, and they aresubject to the laws of nature. People, however, are clearly more thanobjects. What is problematic therefore, according to Green, is totreat a person merely as an object, merely as a means toone's own ends. We can treat other people as means only if we at thesame time respect their integrity as agents with their own purposes(Green 2000, 44).

Green points to Kant's Categorical Imperative, according to which theprohibition is against treating a person merelyasmeans, and not at the same time as an end. As Green emphasises,there is no prohibition against treating a person as a means(as an instrument) (Green 2000, 44). In fact, Green holds, “wemust treat others as instruments, for we need their skills, theircompany, and their bodies—in fact, there is little that wesocial creatures can do on our own, and so little that isfulfilling” (Green 2000, 45–6). According to Green, whenpeople are old, severely disabled, or chronically unemployed what theyfear the most is that they no longer are of use to others. As Greenputs it, “they miss not only their diminished agency, but alsotheir diminished objectivity. … They become… subjectified” (Green 2000, 46).

Martha Nussbaum too aims to challenge the widely-held idea thatobjectification is inconsistent with respect for a person'shumanity. She offers a systematic analysis of objectification, aconcept not at all easy to define and one that writers on the topichave not sufficiently clarified, as she acknowledges (Nussbaum 1995,251).

Objectification, for Nussbaum is the seeing and/or treating a personas an object; it involves treating one thing as another: one istreating as an object what in fact is not an object, but a human being(Nussbaum 1995, 256–7). Nussbaum, then, disagrees with Green'sview that people are partly objects. According to Nussbaum, there areseven features are involved in the idea of objectification:instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility,violability, ownership, denial of subjectivity. (A detailed expositionof these seven features is provided in the introduction of thisentry.)

According to Nussbaum, a person is objectified, when they are seenand/or treated in one or more of the above sevenways. Instrumentality, then, Nussbaum points out, the core notion ofKant/MacKinnon/Dworkin's as well as Green's conceptions ofobjectification, is only one of the ways a person can be treated as anobject. (Nussbaum does believe, however, that, among these sevennotions, instrumentality is especially problematic, and is oftenlinked to other forms of objectification (Nussbaum 1995,265)). Nussbaum's conception of objectification, then, is broader thanKant/MacKinnon/Dworkin's because objectification for Nussbaum is notmerely defined in terms of instrumentalisation, and also because itcan take place when a person is only seen, but not treated,as an object (seen in one or more of the above seven ways that shementions).

According to Nussbaum, objectification need not have devastatingconsequences to a person's humanity. In fact, Nussbaum criticisesMacKinnon and Dworkin for conceiving of objectification as anecessarily negative phenomenon (Nussbaum 1995, 273). Nussbaumbelieves that it is possible that “some features ofobjectification… may in fact in some circumstances… beeven wonderful features of sexual life”, and so “the termobjectification can also be used… in a more positivespirit. Seeing this will require … seeing how the allegedlyimpossible combination between (a form of) objectification andequality, respect, and consent might after all bepossible” (Nussbaum 1995, 251).

According to Nussbaum, then: “In the matter of objectificationcontext is everything. … in many if not all cases, thedifference between an objectionable and a benign use ofobjectification will be made by the overall context of the humanrelationship” (Nussbaum 1995, 271); “… objectification hasfeatures that may be either good or bad, depending upon the overallcontext” (Nussbaum 1995, 251). Objectificationis negative, when it takes place in a context where equality,respect and consent are absent. (Among the negative objectificationcases she discusses in her article are Hankinson's Isabelle andVeronique, the magazine Playboy, and James's TheGolden Bowl). And it is benign/positive, when it iscompatible with equality, respect and consent. Nussbaum gives anexample of benign objectification: “If I am lying around with mylover on the bed, and use his stomach as a pillow there seems to benothing at all baneful about this, provided that I do so with hisconsent (or, if he is asleep, with a reasonable belief that he wouldnot mind), and without causing him pain, provided as well, that I doso in the context of a relationship in which he is generally treatedas more than a pillow” (Nussbaum 1995, 265).

Nussbaum believes that ‘Lawrentian objectification’(objectification occurring between the lovers in D. H. Lawrence'snovels) is a clear example of positive objectification. The passagefrom Lady Chatterley's Lover that she quotes in her articledescribes a sex scene between two lovers. Connie and Mellor, in acontext characterised by rough social equality and respect, identifyeach other with their body parts, they “… put aside theirindividuality and become identified with their bodily organs. They seeone another in terms of those organs” (Nussbaum 1995,275). Consequently, the two lovers deny each other's autonomy andsubjectivity, when engaging in the sex act.

However, Nussbaum explains, “when there is loss of autonomy insex, the context is… one in which on the whole, autonomy isrespected and promoted. … Again, when there is loss ofsubjectivity in the moment of lovemaking, this can be and frequentlyis accompanied by an intense concern for the subjectivity of thepartner at other moments…” (Nussbaum 1995,274–6). As Nussbaum also emphasises in her latest essay onobjectification, a person's “chosen resignation of autonomousself-direction, or her willed passivity may be compatible with, andeven a valued part of, a relationship in which the woman is treated asan end for her own sake… as a full fledged human being”(Nussbaum 2007, 51). Furthermore, Connie and Mellor do not treat eachother merely as means for their purposes, according to Nussbaum. Eventhough they treat each other as tools for sexual pleasure, theygenerally regard each other as more than that. The two lovers, then,are equal and they treat one another as objects in a way that isconsistent with respecting each other as human beings.

Nussbaum's list of the seven features involved in objectification andthe relations that exist between them provides perhaps the mostsystematic analysis of the concept of objectification to date. ButPapadaki has argued that Nussbaum's conception is too broad (Papadaki2010a). A person is objectified, according to Nussbaum, if they areseen and/or treated as an object (in one or more of the seven waysthat she mentions). If every time a person is treated (or merely seen)by another, say, as an instrument (not a mere instrument) forsome further purpose, we take it that the person in question isobjectified, then it seems that in our daily lives we objectify nearlyeveryone, including ourselves. Inevitably, we use each other andourselves instrumentally all the time (for instance, I use a taxidriver as a means to get to my destination, I use myself as a means toprepare a meal, etc). Papadaki argues that if objectification is to bea meaningful concept, we need to restrict it. Halwani is also in favorof a narrower conception of objectification. He argues that we arebetter off with a definition of objectification that includes“only treatment or behavior towards someone”. According tothis view, if someone merely sees or regards another in a sexual way,there is no objectification. Such a definition, Halwani suggests,“…is less cluttered and more accurately reflects theproblem with objectification: its impact on the objectified (oftenthought as victims)” (Halwani 2008, 342 and Halwani2010, 187–8). He believes that we are better off arguing that,in Nussbaum's positive objectification cases, there is noobjectification to begin with. This is better than “engaging inmental gymnastics to try to show that there is objectification butthat it is okay or good” (Halwani 2010, 197). Nussbaum herselfseems to be concerned, at times, about her objectification categorybeing too inclusive. For example, she states that sometimes we do nottreat the occurrence of only one of the seven notions on her list assufficient for objectification (Nussbaum 1995, 258). However, Papadakisuggests, she does not give us enough guidance as to how we can decidewhether objectification is present when a person is treated in one ofthe seven ways she mentions. In addition she suggests that onceobjectification's association with the morally problematic isweakened, there is the risk that the fight against (negative)objectification might be undermined (Papadaki 2010a, 27- 31).

6. The futility of specifying the marks and features of objectification

Recently, Nancy Bauer has expressed scepticism regarding thepossibility of laying out a set of criteria for what counts as sexualobjectification. She argues that it is difficult to specify the marksand features of a term that plays a normative role in our mutuallyshared worldview. And if the term in question is important to myoutlook, but not yours, she claims that it is impossible for me tospecify criteria for the term's application that pick out thephenomenon from your point of view. She writes: “If theterm ‘sexual objectification’ is critical in helping you makesense of the world as you see it, then, more or less, you will knowsexual objectification when you see it. … Insofar as thephilosophical literature sets out to delineate the marks and featuresof sexual objectification, it is bound not only to fail but to missthe very phenomenon it seeks to illuminate” (Bauer, forthcoming,part I).

Regarding the feminist concept of sexual objectification, Bauerexplains that it was coined as part of a feminist shift in how tounderstand the world and one's experience in it. According to theshift in question, in a context in which women experience widespread,systematic, diachronic, and structural disadvantages, certain ways ofperceiving and representing women tend to cause them material andpsychological harm. Bauer argues that once someone participates inthis shift, the term ‘sexual objectification’ will ‘lightup’ the relevant phenomena, and the person in question will seeobjectification everywhere she looks in contemporary culture. This isthe case even if she is not in a position to exactly specify its marksand features. Bauer explains that ‘lighting up’ in certain cases maytake the form of a conversion experience that consists in our seeingthings that we did not see before. For Bauer, the metaphor of‘lighting up’ is crucial in thinking about sexualobjectification and other terms that make sense only in a context of asystematic normative way of understanding the world (what she calls a‘worldview’ (Bauer, forthcoming, part II)).

7. Conclusion

Undoubtedly, objectification is a concept difficult to define, asNussbaum also acknowledges, since it turns out to be‘slippery’ and ‘multiple’ (Nussbaum 1995,251). How to best to define objectification, if we candefine it at all, and whether this notion should be restricted todescribe the morally objectionable, or expanded to cover benign and/orpositive aspects of the way we see and treat each other in our dailylives is an ongoing debate. Much recent feminist work has been devotedto comprehensive philosophical analyses of objectification, which willhopefully lead to more complete and coherent understandings of thisnotion.

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Academic Tools

Other Internet Resources

• Feminists Against Censorship, maintained by Avedon Carol.
• Internet Pornography Statistics, at 2K Reviews.
• Sexual Suggestiveness in Online Ads: Effects of Objectification on Opposite Genders, by Sriram Kalyanaraman, Michael Redding, and Jason Steele, Media Effects Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University, 2000.
• Feminist Philosophers, blog.
• Ms. Blog, Sexual Objectification, Part I: What is it?, maintained by Caroline Heldman.
• Ms. Blog, Sexual Objectification, Part II: The harm, maintained by Caroline Heldman.

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Criticism of Christianity has a long history stretching back to the initial formation of the religion during the Roman Empire. Critics have challenged Christian beliefs and teachings as well as Christian actions, from the Crusades to modern terrorism. The intellectual arguments against Christianity include the suppositions that it is a faith of violence, corruption, superstition, polytheism, and bigotry.

In the early years of Christianity, the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry emerged as one of the major critics with his book Against the Christians. Porphyry argued that Christianity was based on false prophecies that had not yet materialized.^[1] Following the adoption of Christianity under the Roman Empire, dissenting religious voices were gradually suppressed by both governments and ecclesiastical authorities.^[2] A millennium later, the Protestant Reformation led to a fundamental split in European Christianity and rekindled critical voices about the Christian faith, both internally and externally. With the Scientific Revolution and the Age of Enlightenment, Christianity was criticized by major thinkers and philosophers, such as Voltaire, David Hume, Thomas Paine, and the Baron d'Holbach.^[3] The central theme of these critiques sought to negate the historical accuracy of the Christian Bible and focused on the perceived corruption of Christian religious authorities.^[3] Other thinkers, like Immanuel Kant, launched systematic and comprehensive critiques of Christian theology by attempting to refute arguments for theism.^[4]

In modern times, Christianity has faced substantial criticism from a wide array of political movements and ideologies. In the late eighteenth century, the French Revolution saw a number of politicians and philosophers criticizing traditional Christian doctrines, precipitating a wave of secularism in which hundreds of churches were closed down and thousands of priests were deported.^[5] Following the French Revolution, prominent philosophers of liberalism and communism, such as John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx, criticized Christian doctrine on the grounds that it was conservative and anti-democratic. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote that Christianity fostered a kind of slave morality that suppressed the desires contained in the human will.^[6] The Russian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, and several other modern revolutionary movements have also led to the criticism of Christian ideas.

The formal response of Christians to such criticisms is described as Christian apologetics. Philosophers like Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas have been some of the most prominent defenders of the Christian religion since its foundation.

• 1Scripture
  • 1.1Biblical criticism
  • 1.3Unfulfilled prophecy
• 2Criticism of historical behavior
• 3Ethics
  • 3.2Christianity and politics
• 4Doctrine
• 5Criticism of Christians
• 6Criticism by other religions
• 11Further reading

Scripture[edit]

Biblical criticism[edit]

Biblical criticism, in particular higher criticism, covers a variety of methods used since the Enlightenment in the early 18th century as scholars began to apply to biblical documents the same methods and perspectives which had already been applied to other literary and philosophical texts.^[7] It is an umbrella term covering various techniques used mainly by mainline and liberal Christian theologians to study the meaning of biblical passages. It uses general historical principles, and is based primarily on reason rather than revelation or faith. There are four primary types of biblical criticism:^[8]

• Form criticism: an analysis of literary documents, particularly the Bible, to discover earlier oral traditions (stories, legends, myths, etc.) upon which they were based.
• Tradition criticism: an analysis of the Bible, concentrating on how religious traditions grew and changed over the time span during which the text was written.
• Higher criticism: the study of the sources and literary methods employed by the biblical authors.^[8][9]
• Lower criticism: the discipline and study of the actual wording of the Bible; a quest for textual purity and understanding.^[9]

Textual criticism[edit]

Within the abundance of biblical manuscripts exist a number of textual variants. The vast majority of these textual variants are the inconsequential misspelling of words, word order variations^[10] and the mistranscription of abbreviations.^[11] Text critics such as Bart D. Ehrman have proposed that some of these textual variants and interpolations were theologically motivated.^[12] Ehrman's conclusions and textual variant choices have been challenged by some conservative evangelical reviewers, including Daniel B. Wallace, Craig Blomberg, and Thomas Howe.^[13]

In attempting to determine the original text of the New Testament books, some modern textual critics have identified sections as probably not original. In modern translations of the Bible, the results of textual criticism have led to certain verses being left out or marked as not original. These possible later additions include the following:^[14][15]

• The ending of Mark^{[Mk. 16]}
• The story in John of the woman taken in adultery, the Pericope Adulterae
• An explicit reference to the Trinity in 1 John, the Johannine Comma

In The Text Of The New Testament, Kurt and Barbara Aland compare the total number of variant-free verses, and the number of variants per page (excluding orthographic errors), among the seven major editions of the Greek NT (Tischendorf, Westcott-Hort, von Soden, Vogels, Merk, Bover and Nestle-Aland) concluding 62.9%, or 4999/7947, agreement.^[16] They concluded, 'Thus in nearly two-thirds of the New Testament text, the seven editions of the Greek New Testament which we have reviewed are in complete accord, with no differences other than in orthographical details (e.g., the spelling of names, etc.). Verses in which any one of the seven editions differs by a single word are not counted. This result is quite amazing, demonstrating a far greater agreement among the Greek texts of the New Testament during the past century than textual scholars would have suspected… In the Gospels, Acts, and Revelation the agreement is less, while in the letters it is much greater.'^[16]

With the discovery of the Hebrew Bible texts among the Dead Sea Scrolls, questions have been raised about the textual accuracy of the Masoretic text. That is, whether the Masoretic text which forms the basis of the Protestant Old Testament, or other translations such as the Septuagint, Syriac Peshitta, and Samaritan Pentateuch are more accurate.^{[citation needed]}

Internal consistency[edit]

Inconsistencies have been pointed out by critics and skeptics,^[17] presenting as difficulties the different numbers and names for the same feature and different sequences for what is supposed to be the same event. Responses to these criticisms include the modern documentary hypothesis, two-source hypothesis (in various guises), and assertions that the Pastoral Epistles are pseudonymous. Contrasting with these critical stances are positions supported by traditionalists, considering the texts to be consistent, with the Torah written by a single source,^[18][19] but the Gospels by four independent witnesses,^[20] and all of the Pauline Epistles, except possibly the Hebrews, as having been written by Paul the Apostle.

While consideration of the context is necessary when studying the Bible, some find the accounts of the Resurrection of Jesus within the four Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, difficult to reconcile. E. P. Sanders concludes that the inconsistencies make the possibility of a deliberate fraud unlikely: 'A plot to foster belief in the Resurrection would probably have resulted in a more consistent story. Instead, there seems to have been a competition: 'I saw him,' 'So did I,' 'The women saw him first,' 'No, I did; they didn't see him at all,' and so on.'^[21]

Harold Lindsell points out that it is a 'gross distortion' to state that people who believe in biblical inerrancy suppose every statement made in the Bible is true (opposed to accurate).^[22] He indicates there are expressly false statements in the Bible which are reported accurately^[22] (for example, Satan is a liar whose lies are accurately reported as to what he actually said).^[22] Proponents of biblical inerrancy generally do not teach that the Bible was dictated directly by God, but that God used the 'distinctive personalities and literary styles of the writers' of scripture and that God's inspiration guided them to flawlessly project his message through their own language and personality.^{[23]:Art. VIII}

Those who believe in the inspiration of scripture teach that it is infallible (or inerrant), that is, free from error in the truths it expresses by its character as the word of God.^[24] However, the scope of what this encompasses is disputed, as the term includes 'faith and practice' positions, with some denominations holding that the historical or scientific details, which may be irrelevant to matters of faith and Christian practice, may contain errors.^[25] Other scholars take stronger views,^[26] but for a few verses these positions require more exegetical work, leading to dispute (compare the serious debate over the related issue of perspicuity, attracting biblical and philosophical discussion).

Infallibility refers to the original texts of the Bible, and all mainstream scholars acknowledge the potential for human error in transmission and translation; yet, through use textual criticism modern (critical) copies are considered to 'faithfully represent the original',^{[23]:Art. X} and our understanding of the original language sufficiently well for accurate translation. The opposing view is that there is too much corruption, or translation too difficult, to agree with modern texts.

Unfulfilled prophecy[edit]

Hundreds of years before the time of Jesus, Jewish prophets promised that a messiah would come. Judaism claims that Jesus did not fulfill these prophecies. Other skeptics usually claim that the prophecies are either vague or unfulfilled,^[27] or that the Old Testament writings influenced the composition of New Testament narratives.^[28]Christian apologists claim that Jesus fulfilled these prophecies, which they argue are nearly impossible to fulfill by chance.^[29] Many Christians anticipate the Second Coming of Jesus, when he will fulfill the rest of Messianic prophecy, such as the Last Judgment, the general resurrection, establishment of the Kingdom of God, and the Messianic Age (see the article on Preterism for contrasting Christian views).

The New Testament traces Jesus' line to that of David; however, according to Stephen L. Harris:^[30]

Jesus did not accomplish what Israel's prophets said the Messiah was commissioned to do: He did not deliver the covenant people from their Gentile enemies, reassemble those scattered in the Diaspora, restore the Davidic kingdom, or establish universal peace (cf. Isa. 9:6–7; 11:7–12:16, etc.). Instead of freeing Jews from oppressors and thereby fulfilling God's ancient promises—for land, nationhood, kingship, and blessing—Jesus died a 'shameful' death, defeated by the very political powers the Messiah was prophesied to overcome. Indeed, the Hebrew prophets did not foresee that Israel's savior would be executed as a common criminal by Gentiles, making Jesus' crucifixion a 'stumbling block' to scripturally literate Jews. (1 Cor.1:23)

Christian preachers counter this argument by stating that these prophecies will be fulfilled by Jesus in the Millennial Reign after the Great Tribulation, according to New Testament prophecies, especially in the Book of Revelation.

The 16th-century Jewish theologian Isaac ben Abraham, who lived in Trakai, Lithuania, penned a work called Chizzuk Emunah (Faith Strengthened) that attempted to refute the ideas that Jesus was the Messiah prophesied in the Old Testament and that Christianity was the 'New Covenant' of God. He systematically identified a number of inconsistencies in the New Testament, contradictions between the New Testament and the Old Testament, and Old Testament prophesies which remained unfulfilled in Jesus' lifetime. In addition, he questioned a number of Christian practices, such as Sunday Sabbath.^[31] Written originally for Jews to persuade them not to convert to Christianity,^[32] the work was eventually read by Christians. While the well-known Christian Hebraist Johann Christoph Wagenseil attempted an elaborate refutation of Abraham's arguments, Wagenseil's Latin translation of it only increased interest in the work and inspired later Christian freethinkers. Chizzuk Emunah was praised as a masterpiece by Voltaire.^[31]

On the other hand, Blaise Pascal believed that '[t]he prophecies are the strongest proof of Jesus Christ'. He wrote that Jesus was foretold, and that the prophecies came from a succession of people over a span of four thousand years.^[33] Apologist Josh McDowell defends the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy as supporting Christianity, arguing that prophecies fulfilled by Christ include ones relating to his ancestral line, birthplace, virgin birth, miracles, manner of death, and resurrection. He says that even the timing of the Messiah in years and in relation to events is predicted, and that the Jewish Talmud (not accepting Jesus as the Messiah, see also Rejection of Jesus) laments that the Messiah had not appeared despite the scepter being taken away from Judah.^[34]

Prophecy of the Nazarene[edit]

Another example is Nazarene in Matthew 2:23: 'And he came and dwelt in a city called Nazareth, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets, He shall be called a Nazarene.' The website for Jews for Judaism claims that 'Since a Nazarene is a resident of the city of Nazareth and this city did not exist during the time period of the Jewish Bible, it is impossible to find this quotation in the Hebrew Scriptures. It was fabricated.'^[35][36] However, one common suggestion is that the New Testament verse is based on a passage relating to Nazirites, either because this was a misunderstanding common at the time, or through deliberate re-reading of the term by the early Christians. Another suggestion is 'that Matthew was playing on the similarity of the Hebrew word nezer (translated 'Branch' or 'shoot' in Isaiah 11:1 and Jeremiah 23:5) with the Greek nazoraios, here translated 'Nazarene.'^[37] Christians also suggest that by using an indirect quotation and the plural term prophets, 'Matthew was only saying that by living in Nazareth, Jesus was fulfilling the many Old Testament prophecies that He would be despised and rejected.'^[38] The background for this is illustrated by Philip's initial response in John 1:46 to the idea that Jesus might be the Messiah: 'Nazareth! Can anything good come from there?'^[37]

Virgin Birth and descent of Jesus[edit]

A fundamental principle of the Christian faith is that Jesus was born of Mary, a virgin.^[39] Both Matthew and Luke trace the genealogy of Joseph back to David. According to Jewish tradition, the Messiah must be a descendant of David, but if Jesus was born of a virgin, he cannot be a descendant of David through Joseph.^[40] Michael Martin asserts that Mary's virginity is a later addition to Christianity as indicated through Paul's letters.^[41] Further, Martin notes that early Christian communities did not seem to have widely believed in the virgin birth. The confusion surrounding the virginity of Mary may result from Septuagint translation of both Hebrew: עַלְמָה‎, romanized: almah 'young girl' and Hebrew: בְּתוּלָה‎, romanized: bethulah, 'virgin' into Greek: παρθένος, romanized: parthenos, which usually means virgin. Relying on this translation, Matthew tried to show that Jesus's virgin birth was foretold in Isaiah 7:14—which refers to an almah in Hebrew. ^[42][43][44]

Selective interpretation[edit]

Critics argue that the selective invocation of portions of the Old Testament is hypocritical, particularly when those portions endorse hostility towards women and homosexuals, when other portions are considered obsolete. The entire Mosaic Law is described in Galatians 3:24-25 as a tutor which is no longer necessary, according to some interpretations, see also Antinomianism in the New Testament.

On the other hand, many of the Old Testament laws are seen as specifically abrogated by the New Testament, such as circumcision,^[45] though this may simply be a parallel to Jewish Noahide Laws. See also Split of early Christianity and Judaism. On the other hand, other passages are pro-Law, such as Romans 3:31: 'Do we then make void the law through faith? Certainly not! On the contrary, we establish the law.' See also Pauline passages opposing antinomianism.

Mistranslation[edit]

Translation has given rise to a number of issues, as the original languages are often quite different in grammar as well as word meaning. While the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy^[23] states that inerrancy applies only to the original languages, some believers trust their own translation to be the accurate one. One such group of believers is known as the King-James-Only Movement. For readability, clarity, or other reasons, translators may choose different wording or sentence structure, and some translations may choose to paraphrase passages. Because some of the words in the original language have ambiguous or difficult to translate meanings, debates over the correct interpretation occur.

Criticisms are also sometimes raised because of inconsistencies arising between different English translations of the Hebrew or Greek text. Some Christian interpretations are criticized for reflecting specific doctrinal bias^[35] or a variant reading between the Masoretic Hebrew and Septuagint Greek manuscripts often quoted in the New Testament.

Criticism of historical behavior[edit]

Certain interpretations of some moral decisions in the Bible are considered ethically questionable by many modern groups.^[who?] Some of the passages most commonly criticized include colonialism, the subjugation of women, religious intolerance, condemnation of homosexuality, and support for the institution of slavery in both Old and New Testaments.

Colonialism[edit]

Christianity and colonialism are often closely associated because Catholicism and Protestantism were the religions of the European colonial powers^[46] and acted in many ways as the 'religious arm' of those powers.^[47] Initially, Christian missionaries were portrayed as 'visible saints, exemplars of ideal piety in a sea of persistent savagery'. However, by the time the colonial era drew to a close in the last half of the twentieth century, missionaries became viewed as “ideological shock troops for colonial invasion whose zealotry blinded them.”^[48]

Christianity is targeted by critics of colonialism because the tenets of the religion were used to justify the actions of the colonists.^[49] For example, Michael Wood asserts that the indigenous peoples were not considered to be human beings and that the colonisers were shaped by 'centuries of Ethnocentrism, and Christian monotheism, which espoused one truth, one time and version of reality.'^[50]

Slavery[edit]

Early Christian perspectives of slavery were formed in the contexts of Christianity's roots in Judaism, and as part of the wider culture of the Roman Empire. Both the Old and New Testaments recognize that the institution of slavery existed.

Saint Paul the Apostle in addressing slavery in Ephesians 6:-8^{[Eph. 6:5-8]} neither condemns slavery nor condones it. Nothing in the passage affirms slavery as a naturally valid or divinely mandated institution. Rather, Paul’s discussion of the duties of Christian slaves and the responsibilities of Christian masters transforms the institution, even if it falls short of calling for outright abolition. St. Augustine thought slavery was a result of sin, but was part of the fallen world and so should be tolerated. However, others opposed it: John Chrysostom explicitly argued that slavery itself was a sin, but he did not advocate for its abolition; Origen called for the practice of manumission after six years as found in the Old Testament; others, such as Gregory of Nyssa, Acacius of Amida, and St. Patrick, called for the complete abolition of slavery.^[51] On the other hand, others claim that Orthodox Christianity justified slavery on the ground that it was part of the divinely ordained hierarchical order. Not only there are passages in the Bible enjoining slaves to be submissive (Paul to Ephessians: 'slaves, obey your masters with fear and trembling, in singleness of heart, as you obey Christ; not only while being watched, and in order to please them, but as slaves of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart. and to Collosians 'Slaves, obey your earthly masters [kyrioi] according to the flesh in everything, not only while being watched and in order to please them, but wholeheartedly, fearing the Lord [kyrios]')^[52] but more to that, St. John Chrysostom wrote 'The slave should be resigned to his lot, in obeying his master he is obeying God' while St. Augustine wrote: '...slavery is now penal in character and planned by that law which commands the preservation of the natural order and forbids disturbance'.^[53]

According to one view, today and from a human rights perspective, it is difficult to understand why early Christians did not object to the social institution of slavery. It is uncertain whether one can go so far as to criticise Early Christians, including Paul and other authors of Biblical texts, for their active or passive acceptance of slavery.^[54] Peter Gruszka attributed the view of early Christian Fathers on slavery to their social environment. In the 2nd and 3rd centuries, the most prominent fathers such as Clement, Tertullian, Cyprian, Origen and others emerged in Africa and Egypt, where slavery did not exist on large scale. Different was the social environment in Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, Palestine and especially Asia Minor, where slavery was a strong presence and therefore attracted the attention of the Cappadocian fathers of the 4th century.^[55]

According to Jennifer Glancy, sexual exploitation of slaves in Roman Empire, was helped by Christian morality. Jesus urged his followers to act like slaves, implementing a slave morality. The early Christian theologians were unconcerned about slave morals.^[56]

In the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantine), a shift in the view of slavery is noticed, which by the 10th century transformed gradually a slave-object into a slave-subject.^[57]

Since the Middle Ages, the Christian understanding of slavery has been subjected to significant internal conflict and has endured dramatic change. Nearly all Christian leaders before the late 17th century recognised slavery, within specific biblical limitations, as consistent with Christian theology. The key verse used to justify slavery was Genesis 9:25-27: 'Cursed be Canaan! The lowest of slaves will he be to his brothers. He also said, 'Blessed be the Lord, the God of Shem! May Canaan be the slave of Shem.' which was interpreted to mean that Africans were the descendants of Ham, cursed with 'the mark of Ham' to be servants to the descendants of Japheth (Europeans) and Shem (Asians).^[58] In 1452, Pope Nicholas V instituted the hereditary slavery of captured Muslims and pagans, regarding all non-Christians as 'enemies of Christ.'^[59]

The 'Curse of Ham' along with Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians, VI, 5-7 helped American slaveowners to balance their beliefs with slavery. There are plenty other pro-slavery verses in the Old Testament that were often quoted^[which?]. New Testament was ignored except that reminding that Jesus never condemned slavery and the Epistle to Philemon in which a runnaway slave was returned to his owner.^[60]

Rodney Stark makes the argument in For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science, Witch-Hunts, and the End of Slavery,^[61] that Christianity helped to end slavery worldwide, as does Lamin Sanneh in Abolitionists Abroad.^[62] These authors point out that Christians who viewed slavery as wrong on the basis of their religious convictions spearheaded abolitionism, and many of the early campaigners for the abolition of slavery were driven by their Christian faith and a desire to realize their view that all people are equal under God.^[63] In the late 17th century, anabaptists began to criticize slavery. Criticisms from the Society of Friends, Mennonites, and the Amish followed suit. Prominent among these Christian abolitionists were William Wilberforce, and John Woolman. Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote her famous book, Uncle Tom's Cabin, according to her Christian beliefs in 1852. Earlier, in Britain and America, Quakers were active in abolitionism. A group of Quakers founded the first English abolitionist organization, and a Quaker petition brought the issue before government that same year. The Quakers continued to be influential throughout the lifetime of the movement, in many ways leading the way for the campaign. John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, was instrumental in starting abolitionism as a popular movement.^[64]

Many modern Christians are united in the condemnation of slavery as wrong and contrary to God's will. Only peripheral groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and other so-called Christian hate groups on the racist fringes of the Christian Reconstructionist and Christian Identity movements advocate the reinstitution of slavery.^[58] Full adherents to reconstructionism are few and marginalized among conservativeChristians.^[65][66][67] With these exceptions, Christian faith groups now condemn slavery, and see the practice as incompatible with basic Christian principles.^[58][68]

In addition to aiding abolitionism, many Christians made further efforts toward establishing racial equality, contributing to the Civil Rights Movement.^[69]The African American Review notes the important role Christian revivalism in the black church played in the Civil Rights Movement.^[70]Martin Luther King, Jr., an ordained Baptist minister, was a leader of the American Civil Rights Movement and president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, a Christian Civil Rights organization.^[71]

Christianity and women[edit]

Many feminists have accused notions such as a male God, male prophets, and the man-centered stories in the Bible of contributing to a patriarchy.^[73] Though many women disciples and servants are recorded in the Pauline epistles, there have been occasions in which women have been denigrated and forced into a second-class status.^[74] For example, women were told to keep silent in the churches for 'it is a shame for a woman to speak in the church'.^{[1 Cor. 14:34-35]}SuffragistElizabeth Cady Stanton said in The Woman's Bible that 'the Bible in its teachings degrades women from Genesis to Revelation'.^[75]

Elizabeth Clark cites early Christian writings by authors such as Tertullian, Augustine, and John Chrysostom as being exemplary of the negative view of women that has been perpetuated in church tradition.^[76] Until the latter part of the 20th century, only the names of very few women who contributed to the formation of Christianity in its earliest years were widely known: Mary, the mother of Jesus;^[77]Mary Magdalene, disciple of Jesus and the first witness to the resurrection; and Mary and Martha, the sisters who offered him hospitality in Bethany.^[78]

Harvard scholar Karen King writes that more of the many women who contributed to the formation of Christianity in its earliest years are becoming known. Further, she concludes that for centuries in Western Christianity, Mary Magdalene has been wrongly identified as the adulteress and repentant prostitute presented in John 8—a connection supposed by tradition but nowhere claimed in the New Testament. According to King, the Gospel of Mary shows that she was an influential figure, a prominent disciple and leader of one wing of the early Christian movement that promoted women's leadership.

King claims that every sect within early Christianity which had advocated women's prominence in ancient Christianity was eventually declared heretical, and evidence of women's early leadership roles was erased or suppressed.^[78]

Classicist Evelyn Stagg and New Testament scholar Frank Stagg in their jointly authored book, Woman in the World of Jesus, document very unfavorable attitudes toward women that prevailed in the world into which Jesus came. They assert that there is no recorded instance where Jesus disgraces, belittles, reproaches, or stereotypes a woman. They interpret the recorded treatment and attitude Jesus showed to women as evidence that the Founder of Christianity treated women with great dignity and respect.^[79] Various theologians have concluded that the canonical examples of the manner of Jesus are instructive for inferring his attitudes toward women. They are seen as showing repeatedly and consistently how he liberated and affirmed women.^[80] However, Schalom Ben-Chorin argues that Jesus' reply to his mother in John 2:4 during the wedding at Cana amounted to a blatant violation of the commandment to honor one's parent.^{[Ex. 20:12][81]}

Christianity and violence[edit]

Many critics of Christianity have cited the violent acts of Christian nations as a reason to denounce the religion. Science-fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke said that he could not forgive religions for the atrocities and wars over time.^[82]Richard Dawkins makes a similar case in his book, The God Delusion. In the counterargument book The Dawkins Delusion?,Alister McGrath responds to Dawkins by suggesting that, far from endorsing 'out-group hostility', Jesus commanded an ethic of 'out-group affirmation'. McGrath agrees that it is necessary to critique religion, but says that Dawkins seems unaware that it possesses internal means of reform and renewal. While Christians may certainly be accused of failing to live up to Jesus' standard of acceptance, it is there at the heart of the Christian ethic.^[83]

Peace, compassion and forgiveness of wrongs done by others are key elements of Christian teaching.^[84] However, Christians have struggled since the days of the Church fathers with the question of when the use of force is justified.^[85] Such debates have led to concepts such as just war theory. Throughout history, biblical passages have been used to justify the use of force against heretics,^[86] sinners^[87] and external enemies.^[88] Heitman and Hagan identify the Inquisitions, Crusades, wars of religion and antisemitism as being 'among the most notorious examples of Christian violence'.^[89] To this list, J. Denny Weaver adds, 'warrior popes, support for capital punishment, corporal punishment under the guise of 'spare the rod and spoil the child', justifications of slavery, world-wide colonialism in the name of conversion to Christianity, the systemic violence of women subjected to men'. Weaver employs a broader definition of violence that extends the meaning of the word to cover 'harm or damage', not just physical violence per se. Thus, under his definition, Christian violence includes 'forms of systemic violence such as poverty, racism, and sexism'.^[90]

Although some Christians have relied on Christian teaching to justify their use of force, other^[which?] Christians have opposed the use of force and violence. Some^[which?] of the latter have formed sects that have emphasized pacificism as a central tenet of their faith.^{[citation needed]} Christians have also engaged in violence against those that they classify as heretics and non-believers. In Letter to a Christian Nation, critic of religion Sam Harris writes that '...faith inspires violence in at least two ways. First, people often kill other human beings because they believe that the creator of the universe wants them to do it... Second, far greater numbers of people fall into conflict with one another because they define their moral community on the basis of their religious affiliation...'^[91]

Christian theologians point to a strong doctrinal and historical imperative within Christianity against violence, particularly Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, which taught nonviolence and love of enemies. Weaver says that Jesus' pacifism was 'preserved in the justifiable war doctrine that declares all war as sin even when declaring it occasionally a necessary evil, and in the prohibition of fighting by monastics and clergy as well as in a persistent tradition of Christian pacifism'.^[92] Others point out sayings and acts of Jesus that do not fit this description: the absence of any censure of the soldier who asks Jesus to heal his servant, his overturning the tables and chasing the moneychangers from the temple with a rope in his hand, and through his Apostles, baptising a Roman Centurion who is never asked to first give up arms.^[93]

Historically, prohibitions on fighting by monastics and clerics have often been discarded; the notion of military monasticism, emerged in the 12th century, in large part because of the advocacy of St. Bernard of Clairvaux. Bernard - and, once the papacy gave sanction to the idea, the entire Catholic Church - believed that existing Christian methods of serving the Church's ends in war were inadequate, and that a group of dedicated warrior monks could achieve spiritual merit by waging war, rather than despite it. In this view, war against heretics justified means of waging war that fell outside the bounds of just war; for example, the Teutonic Order, which received papal sanction, made frequent use of massacre and the use of violence to compel conversion during the Baltic Crusades.^[94]

Science[edit]

During the 19th century an interpretive model of the relationship between religion and science known today as the conflict theory developed, according to which interaction between religion and science almost inevitably leads to hostility and conflict. A popular example was the misconception that people from the Middle Ages believed that the Earth was flat, and that only science, freed from religious dogma, had shown that it was spherical. This thesis was a popular historiographical approach during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but most contemporary historians of science now reject it.^[95][96][97]

The notion of a war between science and religion remained common in the historiography of science during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.^[98] Most of today's historians of science consider that the conflict thesis has been superseded by subsequent historical research.^[99] The framing of the relationship between Christianity and science as being predominantly one of conflict is still prevalent in popular culture.^[100]

The astronomer Carl Sagan, mentioned the dispute between the astronomical systems of Ptolemy (who thought that the sun and planets revolved around the earth) and Copernicus (who thought the earth and planets revolved around the sun). He states in Cosmos: A Personal Voyage that Ptolemy's belief was 'supported by the church through the Dark Ages… [It] effectively prevented the advance of astronomy for 1,500 years.'^[101]Ted Peters in Encyclopedia of Religion writes that although there is some truth in this story, it has been exaggerated and has become 'a modern myth perpetuated by those wishing to see warfare between science and religion who were allegedly persecuted by an atavistic and dogma-bound ecclesiastical authority'.^[102] In 1992, the Catholic Church's seeming vindication of Galileo attracted much comment in the media.

Ethics[edit]

The philosopherFriedrich Nietzsche was a notable critic of the ethics of Christianity. See Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche#Christianity and morality.

Ethics in the Bible[edit]

The ethics in the bible have been criticized, such as the commands in the old testament by God to commit genocide, and to spare no people.^[104] The existence of evil has been argued as evidence of no omnipotent omnibenevolent being, however skeptical theism suggests that humans do not have the understanding of the big picture to make an adequate assessment. However, a counter argument by Stephen Maitzen suggests that the ethical inconsistency in the bible that is not followed by most Christians or Jews today, such as the execution of homosexuals, blasphemers, disobedient children, or the punishment for mixing linen and cloth, ultimately undermines the skeptical theism argument.^[105] Christian ethics have also been criticized for breeding intolerance (such as anti-semitic views), and for having a repressive nature. Criticism has also been aimed at the core of Christian ethics, the threat of hell.^[106]

Christianity and politics[edit]

Some leftists and libertarians, including Christians who disavow the Religious Right, use the term Christian fascism or Christofascism to describe what some see as an emerging neoconservative proto-fascism or Evangelical nationalism and possible theocratic sentiment in the United States.^[107]

Reverend Rich Lang of the Trinity United Methodist Church of Seattle gave a sermon titled 'George Bush and the Rise of Christian Fascism', in which he said, 'I want to flesh out the ideology of the Christian Fascism that Bush articulates. It is a form of Christianity that is the mirror opposite of what Jesus embodied.'^[108]

Christian right[edit]

Conservative Christians are often accused of being intolerant by secular humanists and liberal Christians, claiming that they oppose science that seems to contradict scripture (Creationism, use of birth control, abortion, research into embryonic stem cells, etc.), liberal democracy (separation of church and state), and progressive social policies (rights of people of other races and religions, of women, and of people with different sexual orientations).^{[109][110][111][112]}

United States[edit]

Gallup polling shows that within the US, trust in organized religion has declined since the 1970s.^[113] Phil Zuckerman, a sociology professor, argues that political campaigning against same-sex marriage in churches “is turning off so many people from Christianity,” and responsible for a decline in the number of Christians in the United States.^[114]

David Kinnaman, president of the Barna Institute, and Gabe Lyons of the Fermi Project published a study of attitudes of 16- to 29-year-old Americans towards Christianity. They found that about 38% of all those who were not regular churchgoers had negative impressions of Christianity, and especially evangelical Christianity, associating it with conservative political activism, hypocrisy, anti-homosexuality, authoritarianism, and judgmentalism.^[115] About 17% had 'very bad' perceptions of Christianity.^{[116][117][118]}

Role of women[edit]

There are three major viewpoints within modern Christianity over the role of women. They are known respectively as Christian feminism, Christian egalitarianism and complementarianism.

• Christian feminists take a feminist position from a Christian perspective.^[119]
• Christian egalitarians advocate ability-based, rather than gender-based, ministry of Christians of all ages, ethnicities and socio-economic classes.^[120] Egalitarians support the ordination of women and equal roles in marriage, but are theologically and morally more conservative than Christian feminists and prefer to avoid the label 'feminist'. A limited notion of gender complementarity is held by some, known as 'complementarity without hierarchy'.^[121]
• Complementarians support both equality and beneficial differences between men and women.^[122] They believe the Bible teaches that men and women have distinct complementary roles in both marriage and in the church. They maintain that men have a responsibility to lead and women have a responsibility to submit to the leadership of men.

Some Christians argue that the idea of God as a man is based less on gender but rather on the dominant Patriarchal society of the time in which men acted as leaders and caretakers of the Family.^[123] Thus, the idea of God being 'The Father' is with regards to his relationship with what are 'his children', Christians.

Most mainline Christians claim that the doctrine of the Trinity implies that God should be called Father and not called Mother, in the same way that Jesus was a man and was not a woman.^[124] Jesus tells His followers to address God as Father.^{[Mt. 6:9-13]} He tells his disciples to be merciful as their heavenly Father is merciful.^{[Lk. 6:36]} He says the Father will give the Holy Spirit to those who ask^{[Lk. 11:13]} and that the Spirit of their Father will speak through them in times of persecution.^{[Mt. 10:20]} On Easter Sunday, he directs Mary Magdalene to tell the other disciples, 'I am going to my Father and your Father....'^{[Jn. 20:17]} Mark Brumley points out that behind New Testament language of Divine Adoption and regeneration is the idea that God is our Father because He is the 'source' or 'origin' of our new life in Christ. He has saved us through Christ and sanctified us in the Spirit. Brumley claims this is clearly more than a metaphor; the analogy with earthly fatherhood is obvious. God is not merely like a father for Christ’s followers; he is really their Father. Among Christians who hold to this idea, there is a distinct sense that Jesus' treatment of women should imply equality in leadership and marital roles every bit as strongly as the definite male gender of Jesus should imply a name of Father for God. Rather than as antifeminist, they characterize alternative naming as unnecessary and unsupported by the words found in the Bible.^[124]

In 2000, the Southern Baptist Convention voted to revise its 'Baptist Faith and Message' (Statement of Faith),^[125] opposing women as pastors. While this decision is not binding and would not prevent women from serving as pastors, the revision itself has been criticized by some from within the convention. In the same document, the Southern Baptist Convention took a strong position of the subordinating view of woman in marriage: 'A wife is to submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her husband. She has the God-given responsibility to respect her husband and to serve as his helper in managing the household and nurturing the next generation.'^[125] (Emphasis added)

The Eastern Orthodox Church does not allow female clergy. The Chaldean Catholic Church on the other hand continues to maintain a large number of deaconesses serving alongside male deacons during mass.^[126]

In some evangelical churches, it is forbidden for women to become pastors, deacons or church elders. In support of such prohibitions, the verse 1 Timothy 2:12 is often cited:^[127]

“But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence.”

Doctrine[edit]

Miracles[edit]

Philosopher David Hume argued against the plausibility of miracles:^[128]

1) A miracle is a violation of the known laws of nature;
2) We know these laws through repeated and constant experience;
3) The testimony of those who report miracles contradicts the operation of known scientific laws;
4) Consequently no one can rationally believe in miracles.

The Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox Church reject Hume's argument against miracles outright with the teachings of St. Gregory Palamas, who postulated that Reason alone was not sufficient to understand God's energies (activities such as miracles) and essence, but faith was.^[129] Of course, when no one would hear anything classified as Christianity but for the communications of other human beings, the question of just where faith has been placed arises.

Miraculous healings through prayers, often involving the 'laying on of hands', have been reported. However, reliance on faith healing alone can indirectly contribute to serious harm and even death.^[130]Christian apologists including C.S. Lewis, Norman Geisler and William Lane Craig have argued that miracles are reasonable and plausible.^{[131][132][133]}

Incarnation[edit]

Celsus found it hard to reconcile Christian human God who was born and matured with his Jewish God who was supposed to be one and unchanging. He asked 'if God wanted to reform humanity, why did he choose to descend and live on earth? How his brief presence in Jerusalem could benefit all the millions of people who lived elsewhere in the world or who had lived and died before his incarnation?'^[134]

One classical response is Lewis's trilemma, a syllogism popularised by C. S. Lewis that intended to demonstrate the logical inconsistency of both holding Jesus of Nazareth to be a 'great moral teacher' while also denying his divinity. The logical soundness of this trilemma has been widely questioned.^[135]

Hell and damnation[edit]

Christianity has been criticized as seeking to persuade people into accepting its authority through simple fear of punishment or, conversely, through hope of reward after death, rather than through rational argumentation or empirical evidence.^[136] Traditional Christian doctrine dictates that, without faith in Jesus Christ or in the Christian faith in general, one is subject to eternal punishment in Hell.^[137]

Critics regard the eternal punishment of those who fail to adopt Christian faith as morally objectionable, and consider it an abhorrent picture of the nature of the world. On a similar theme objections are made against the perceived injustice of punishing a person for all eternity for a temporal crime. Some Christians agree (see Annihilationism and Trinitarian Universalism). These beliefs have been considered especially repugnant^[138] when the claimed omnipotent God makes, or allows a person to come into existence, with a nature that desires that which God finds objectionable.^[139]

In the Abrahamic religions, Hell has traditionally been regarded as a punishment for wrongdoing or sin in this life, as a manifestation of divine justice. As in the problem of evil, some apologists argue that the torments of Hell are attributable not to a defect in God's benevolence, but in human free will. Although a benevolent God would prefer to see everyone saved, he would also allow humans to control their own destinies. This view opens the possibility of seeing Hell not as retributive punishment, but rather as an option that God allows, so that people who do not wish to be with God are not forced to be. C. S. Lewis most famously proposed this view in his book The Great Divorce, saying: 'There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, 'Thy will be done,' and those to whom God says, in the end, 'Thy will be done.'

Hell is not seen as strictly a matter of retributive justice even by the more traditionalist churches. For example, the Eastern Orthodox see it as a condition brought about by, and the natural consequence of, free rejection of God's love.^[140]The Roman Catholic Church teaches that hell is a place of punishment^[141] brought about by a person's self exclusion from communion with God.^[142] In some ancient Eastern Orthodox traditions, Hell and Heaven are distinguished not spatially, but by the relation of a person to God's love.

Some modern critics of the doctrine of Hell (such as Marilyn McCord Adams) claim that, even if Hell is seen as a choice rather than as punishment, it would be unreasonable for God to give such flawed and ignorant creatures as humans the awesome responsibility of their eternal destinies.^[143]Jonathan Kvanvig, in his book, The Problem of Hell, agrees that God would not allow one to be eternally damned by a decision made under the wrong circumstances. For instance, one should not always honor the choices of human beings, even when they are full adults, if, for instance, the choice is made while depressed or careless. On Kvanvig's view, God will abandon no person until they have made a settled, final decision, under favorable circumstances, to reject God, but God will respect a choice made under the right circumstances. Once a person finally and competently chooses to reject God, out of respect for the person's autonomy, God allows them to be annihilated.^[144]

Idolatry[edit]

Christian have sometimes been accused of idolatry, especially in regards in the iconoclastic controversy.^[145] However, Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christian forbid worship of icons and relics as divine in themselves, while honouring those represented by them is accepted and philosophically justified by the Second Council of Constantinople.

Limbo[edit]

The Roman Catholic Church teaches that baptism is a necessity. In the 5th century, St. Augustineconcluded that infants who die without baptism were consigned to hell.^[146] By the 13th century, theologians referred to the 'limbo of infants' as a place where unbaptized babies were deprived of the vision of God, but did not suffer because they did not know of that which they were deprived, and moreover enjoyed perfect natural happiness. The 1983 Code of Canon Law (1183 §2) specifies that 'Children whose parents had intended to have them baptized but who died before baptism, may be allowed church funeral rites by the local ordinary'.^[147] In 2007, the 30-member International Theological Commission revisited the concept of limbo.^[148][149] However, the commission also said that hopefulness was not the same as certainty about the destiny of such infants.^[148] Rather, as stated in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1257, 'God has bound salvation to the sacrament of Baptism, but he himself is not bound by his sacraments.'^[150] Hope in the mercy of God is not the same as certainty through the sacraments, but it is not without result, as demonstrated in Jesus' statement to the thief on the cross in Luke 23:42-43.

The concept of limbo is not accepted by the Orthodox Church or by Protestants.^[151]

Atonement[edit]

The idea of atonement for sin is criticized by Richard Dawkins on the grounds that the image of God as requiring the suffering and death of Jesus to effect reconciliation with humankind is immoral. The view is summarized by Dawkins: 'if God wanted to forgive our sins, why not just forgive them? Who is God trying to impress?'^[152] Oxford theologian Alister McGrath maintains that Dawkins is 'ignorant' of Christian theology, and therefore unable to engage religion and faith intelligently. He goes on to say that the atonement was necessary because of our flawed human nature, which made it impossible for us to save ourselves, and that it expresses God's love for us by removing the sin that stands in the way of our reconciliation with God.^[153] Responding to the criticism that he is 'ignorant' of theology, Dawkins asks, 'Do you have to read up on leprechology before disbelieving in leprechauns?'^[154] and '[y]es, I have, of course, met this point before. It sounds superficially fair. But it presupposes that there is something in Christian theology to be ignorant about. The entire thrust of my position is that Christian theology is a non-subject.'^[155]Dinesh D'Souza says that Dawkins' criticism 'only makes sense if you assume Christians made the whole thing up.' He goes on to say that Christians view it as a beautiful sacrifice, and that 'through the extremity of Golgotha, Christ reconciles divine justice and divine mercy.'^[156] Andrew Wilson argues that Dawkins misses the point of the atonement, which has nothing to do with masochism, but is based on the concepts of holiness, sin and grace.^[157]

Robert Green Ingersoll suggests that the concept of the atonement is simply an extension of the Mosaic tradition of blood sacrifice and 'is the enemy of morality'.^[158][159] The death of Jesus Christ represents the blood sacrifice to end all blood sacrifices; the resulting mechanism of atonement by proxy through that final sacrifice has appeal as a more convenient and much less costly approach to redemption than repeated animal sacrifice—a common sense solution to the problem of reinterpreting ancient religious approaches based on sacrifice.

The prominent Christian apologist Josh McDowell, in More Than A Carpenter, addresses the issue through an analogy of a real-life judge in California who was forced to fine his daughter $100 for speeding, but then came down, took off his robe, and paid the fine for her from his billfold,^[160] though as in this and other cases, illustrations are only cautiously intended to describe certain aspects of the atonement.^[161]

Second Coming[edit]

Several verses in the New Testament contain Jesus' predictions that the Second Coming would take place within a century following his death.^[162] Jesus appears to promise for his followers the second coming to happen before the generation he is preaching to vanishes. This is seen as an essential failure in the teachings of Christ by many critics such as Bertrand Russell.^[163]

However, Preterists argue that Jesus did not mean his second coming^{[Matt. 16:28]} but speaks about demonstrations of his might, formulating this as 'coming in his kingdom', especially the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple 70 AD, which he foretold, and by which time not all of his disciples were still living.^[164] According to this view Matthew 10:23 should be understood in the same way.^[165]

Inconsistency with Old Testament conception of the afterlife[edit]

Most Christian traditions teach belief in life after death as a central and indispensable tenet of their faith. Critics argue that the Christian conception of the afterlife is inconsistent with that described in the Old Testament. George E. Mendenhall believes there is no concept of immortality or life after death in the Old Testament.^[166] The presumption is that the deceased are inert, lifeless, and engaging in no activity.^[166]

The idea of Sheol ('שׁאול') or a state of nothingness was shared among Babylonian and Israelite beliefs. 'Sheol, as it was called by the ancient Israelites, is the land of no return, lying below the cosmic ocean, to which all, the mighty and the weak, travel in the ghostly form they assume after death, known as Rephaim. There the dead have no experience of either joy or pain, perceiving no light, feeling no movement.'^[167] Obayashi alludes that the Israelites were satisfied with such a shadowy realm of afterlife because they were more deeply concerned with survival.^[167]

Before Christianity began in the 1st century, the belief in an afterlife was already prevalent in Jewish thinking^[168] among the Pharisees^[169][170] and Essenes.^[171] The themes of unity and Sheol which largely shaped the ancient tradition of Judaism had been undermined when only the most pious of Jews were being massacred during the Maccabean revolt.

Criticism of Christians[edit]

Hypocrisy[edit]

Gaudium et spes claims that the example of Christians may be a contributory factor to atheism, writing, '…believers can have more than a little to do with the birth of atheism. To the extent that they neglect their own training in the faith, or teach erroneous doctrine, or are deficient in their religious, moral, or social life, they must be said to conceal rather than reveal the authentic face of God and religion.'^[172]

Secular and religious critics have accused many Christians of being hypocritical.^[173] Tom Whiteman, a Philadelphia psychologist found that the primary reasons for Christian divorce include adultery, abuse (including substance, physical and verbal abuse), and abandonment whereas the number one reason cited for divorce in the general population was incompatibility.^[174]

Materialism[edit]

Instead of understanding and following the teachings of Jesus, the Christians argued and quarreled about the nature of Jesus’s divinity and about the Trinity. They called each other heretics and persecuted each other and cut each other’s heads off. There was a great and violent controversy at one time among different Christian sects over a certain diphthong. One party said that the word Homo-ousion should be used in a prayer; the other wanted Homoi-ousion-this difference had reference to the divinity of Jesus. Over this diphthong fierce war was raged and large numbers of people were slaughtered.

I like your Christ. I do not like your Christians. Your Christians are so unlike your Christ. The materialism of affluent Christian countries appears to contradict the claims of Jesus Christ that says it's not possible to worship both Mammon and God at the same time.

Sectarianism[edit]

Some have argued that Christianity is undermined by the inability of Christians to agree on matters of faith and church governance, and the tendency for the content of their faith to be determined by regional or political factors. Schopenhauer sarcastically suggested:

To the South German ecclesiastic the truth of the Catholic dogma is quite obvious, to the North German, the Protestant. If then, these convictions are based on objective reasons, the reasons must be climatic, and thrive, like plants, some only here, some only there. The convictions of those who are thus locally convinced are taken on trust and believed by the masses everywhere.^[178]

Christians respond that Ecumenism has helped bring together such communities, where in the past mistranslations of Christological Greek terms may have resulted in seemingly different views. Non-denominational Christianity represents another approach towards reducing the divisions within Christianity, although many Christian groups claiming to be non-denominational wind up with similar problems.

Persecution by Christians[edit]

Individuals and groups throughout history have been persecuted by certain Christians (and Christian groups) based upon sex, sexual orientation, race, and religion (even within the bounds of Christianity itself). Many of the persecutors attempted to justify their actions with particular scriptural interpretations. During Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, important Christian theologians advocated religious persecution to varying degrees.^{[citation needed]} However, Early modern Europe witnessed a turning point in the Christian debate on persecution and toleration. Nowadays all significant Christian denominations embrace religious toleration, and 'look back on centuries of persecution with a mixture of revulsion and incomprehension'.^[179]

Early Christianity was a minority religion in the Roman Empire and the early Christians were themselves persecuted during that time. After Constantine I converted to Christianity, it became the dominant religion in the Roman Empire. Already under the reign of Constantine I, Christian heretics had been persecuted; beginning in the late 4th century AD also the ancient pagan religions were actively suppressed. In the view of many historians, the Constantinian shift turned Christianity from a persecuted into a persecuting religion.^[180]

After the decline of the Roman Empire, the further Christianization of Europe was to a large extent peaceful.^[181] However, encounters between Christians and Pagans were sometimes confrontational, and some Christian kings (Charlemagne, Olaf I of Norway) were known for their violence against pagans. In the late Middle Ages, the appearance of the Cathars and Bogomils in Europe laid the stage for the later witch-hunts. These (probably gnostic-influenced) sects were seen as heretics by the Catholic Church, and the Inquisition was established to counter them.

After the Protestant Reformation, the devastation caused by the partly religiously motivated wars (Thirty Years' War, English Civil War, French Wars of Religion) in Europe in the 17th century gave rise to the ideas of religious toleration, freedom of religion and religious pluralism.

Response of apologists[edit]

Christians will sometimes point out that in their points of view, the wrongdoings of other Christians are not the fault of their religious scriptures but of those who have wrongly interpreted it. They posit that the mistakes of Christians do not refute the validity of their teachings, but merely proves their weakness and sinful nature, of which they then turn to Christ. Thus, according to them, the 'Word of God' can still be true and valid without it having been accurately followed.^{[citation needed]} According to Ron Sider, an Evangelical theologian, 'The tragedy is that poll after poll by Gallup and Barna show that evangelicals live just like the world. Contrast that with what the New Testament says about what happens when people come to living faith in Christ. There's supposed to be radical transformation in the power of the Holy Spirit (2 Cor 5:17, 1 Cor 10:13). The disconnect between our biblical beliefs and our practice is just, I think, heart-rending.'^[173]

Similar arguments are held by Roman Catholics against critics of the Catholic Church, or by other Christians defending their respective Churches.^{[citation needed]} of the Church's structure. Roman Catholics will argue that Popes who were corrupt in the Middle Ages is not the fault of the position of the Papacy or of the fact that there are obedient Priests lower in the hierarchy, but the fault of the individual people who act as 'God's representative on Earth'. Such examples can be seen in Dante's Divine Comedy, where Roman Catholic Clergy who had practiced simony find themselves in the lower circles of hell.

Anti-clericalism in Nazi Germany[edit]

Adolf Hitler's 1920 Nazi Party Platform promoted Positive Christianity—which mixed ideas of racial purity and Nazi ideology with elements of Christianity and removed 'Jewish' elements.^[184][185]

Nazism aimed to transform the subjective consciousness of the German people—their attitudes, values and mentalities—into a single-minded, obedient 'national community'. The Nazis believed they would therefore have to replace class, religious and regional allegiances.^[186] Under the Gleichschaltung process, Hitler attempted to create a unified Protestant Reich Church from Germany's 28 existing Protestant churches. The plan failed, and was resisted by the Confessing Church. Persecution of the Catholic Church in Germany followed the Nazi takeover. Hitler moved quickly to eliminate political catholicism. Amid harassment of the Church, the Reich concordat treaty with the Vatican was signed in 1933, and promised to respect Church autonomy. Hitler routinely disregarded the Concordat, closing all Catholic institutions whose functions were not strictly religious. Clergy, nuns, and lay leaders were targeted, with thousands of arrests over the ensuing years.^[187]

Hitler was supportive of Christianity in public, yet hostile to it in private. Anti-clericalists like Joseph Goebbels and Martin Bormann saw the conflict with the Churches as a priority concern, and anti-church and anti-clerical sentiments were strong among grassroots party activists.^[182] Hitler was born to a practising Catholic mother and an anticlerical father, but after leaving home Hitler never again attended Mass or received the sacraments. According to biographer Alan Bullock, Hitler retained some regard for the organisational power of Catholicism but held private contempt for its central teachings, which he said, if taken to their conclusion, 'would mean the systematic cultivation of the human failure.':^[183]

Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Propaganda used his position to widely publicise trials of clergy and nuns in his propaganda campaigns, showing the cases in the worst possible light. In 1928, soon after his election to the Reichstag, Goebbels wrote in his diary that National Socialism was a 'religion' that needed a genius to uproot 'outmoded religious practices' and put new ones in their place: 'One day soon National Socialism will be the religion of all Germans. My Party is my church, and I believe I serve the Lord best if I do his will, and liberate my oppressed people from the fetters of slavery. That is my gospel.'^[188] As the war progressed, on the 'Church Question', he wrote 'after the war it has to be generally solved... There is, namely, an insoluble opposition between the Christian and a heroic-German world view'.^[182]

Hitler's chosen deputy and private secretary, Martin Bormann, was a rigid guardian of National Socialist orthodoxy and saw Christianity and Nazism as 'incompatible' (mainly because of its Jewish origins),^[187][189] as did the official Nazi philosopher, Alfred Rosenberg. In his 'Myth of the Twentieth Century' (1930), Rosenberg wrote that the main enemies of the Germans were the 'Russian Tartars' and 'Semites' - with 'Semites' including Christians, especially the Catholic Church.^[190]

According to Bullock, Hitler considered the Protestant clergy to be 'insignificant' and 'submissive' and lacking in a religion to be taken seriously.^[191] Hitler attempted to create a unified Protestant Reich Church from 28 separate regional churches through Gleichschaltung. His bid to create a unified Reich Church ultimately failed, and Hitler became disinterested in supporting the so-called 'German Christians' Nazi aligned movement. Hitler initially lent support to Ludwig Muller, a Nazi and former naval chaplain, to serve as Reich Bishop, but his heretical views against Paul the Apostle and the Semitic origins of Christ and the Bible (see Positive Christianity) quickly alienated sections of the Protestant church. Lutheran Pastor Martin Neimoller created the Confessing Church movement to oppose the Nazification of Protestant churches.^[192] Neimoller was arrested by the Gestapo in 1937, and sent to the concentration camps.^[193] The Confessing Church seminary was prohibited that same year.^[194]

Christian persecution complex[edit]

Christian persecution complex is the notion that Christian values and Christians are being oppressed by social groups and governments.^[195] According to Elizabeth Castelli, some set the starting point in the middle of the 20th century while others point to the 90's. After 9/11, it accelerated.^[196] The concept that Christianity is being oppressed is popular among conservative politicians in contemporary politics in the United States, and they utilize this idea to address issues concerning LGBT people or the ACA’s Contraceptives Mandate, which they perceive as an attack on Christianity.^[197]

Others (like professor Candida Moss and lecturer Paul Cavill) point out, that this mentality of being persecuted roots back at early Christianity era.^[198] It appeared during the era of early Christianity due to internal Christian identity politics.^[199][200] claims that the New Testament teaches that persecutions are inherent to Christianity.^[201]

Criticism by other religions[edit]

Hinduism[edit]

Ram Mohan Roy criticized Christian doctrines, and asserted that how 'unreasonable' and 'self-contradictory' they are.^[202] He further adds that people, even from India were embracing Christianity due to the economic hardship and weakness, just like European Jews were pressured to embrace Christianity, by both encouragement and force.^[203]

Vivekananda regarded Christianity as 'collection of little bits of Indian thought. Ours is the religion of which Buddhism with all its greatness is a rebel child, and of which Christianity is a very patchy imitation.'^[204]

Philosopher Dayanand Saraswati, regarded Christianity as 'barbarous religion, and a 'false religion' religion believed only by fools and by the people in a state of barbarism,'^[205] he included that Bible contains many stories and precepts that are immoral, praising cruelty, deceit and encouraging sin.^[206]

In 1956 the Niyogi Committee Report On Christian Missionary Activities was published by the Government of Madhya Pradesh. This influential report on controversial missionary activities in India recommended that suitable controls on conversions brought about through illegal means should be implemented.^[207] Also in the 1950s, K.M. Panikkar's work 'Asia and Western Dominance' was published and was one of the first post-Independence Indian critiques of Christian missions. It argued that the attempt to convert Asia has definitely failed, and that this failure was due to the missionaries' claim of a monopoly of truth which was alien to the Asian mind; their association with imperialism and the attitude of moral and racial superiority of the Christian West.^[207]

The Indian writer and philosopher Ram Swarup was 'most responsible for reviving and re-popularizing' the Hindu critique of Christian missionary practices in the 1980s.^[208] He insisted that monotheistic religions like Christianity 'nurtured among their adherents a lack of respect for other religions'.^[208] Other important writers who criticized Christianity from an Indian and Hindu perspective include Sita Ram Goel and Arun Shourie.^[209][208]Arun Shourie urged Hindus to be 'alert to the fact that missionaries have but one goal - that of harvesting us for the church'; and he wrote that they have 'developed a very well-knit, powerful, extremely well-endowned organizational framework' for attaining that goal.^[209] In his 'widely read and cited' book Missionaries in India, Shourie tried to build a case that Christian evangelistic methods were cynically calculating and materialistic, and to Shourie, missionary strategizing 'sounded more like the Planning Commission, if not the Pentagon, than like Jesus'.^[208][210]

Indian philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, wrote:

Unfortunately Christian religion inherited the Semitic creed of the ‘jealous God’ in the view of Christ as ‘the only begotten son of God’ so could not brook any rival near the throne. When Europe accepted the Christian religion, in spite of its own broad humanism, it accepted the fierce intolerance which is the natural result of belief in 'the truth once for all delivered to the saints.'^[211]

Judaism[edit]

Shlomo ben Aderet criticized Christianity, adding that it has lesser form of monotheism, and lacks a unified deity compared to Judaism.^[212]

David Flusser viewed Christianity as 'Cheaper Judaism' and highly anti-Judaism. He also highlighted the 'failure of christianity to convert the Jewish people to the new message' as 'precisely the reason for the strong anti-jewish trend in christianity.'^[213]

Professor Moshe Halbertal, regards Christianity to be 'idolatrous religion' and he further adds that the idolatry by Christians 'opened the door to the easing of many other restrictive prohibitions.'^[214]

Stephen Samuel Wise in his own words was critical towards the Christian community for their failure to rescue Jews from Europe during Nazi rule. He wrote that:

A Christian world that will permit millions of Jews to be slain without moving heaven by prayer and earth in every human way to save its Jews has lost its capacity for moral and spiritual survival.^[215]

Islam[edit]

According to the Qu'ran, At-Tawba 31, Christians should follow one God, but they have made multiple.

They have taken as lords beside Allah their rabbis and their monks and the Messiah son of Mary, when they were bidden to worship only One God.^[216]

Muslim scholars have criticized Christianity, usually for its Trinity concept. They argue that this doctrine is an invention, distortion of the idea about God, and presentation of the idea that there are three gods.^[217]

Origins[edit]

Some have argued that Christianity is not founded on a historical Jesus, but rather on a mythical creation.^[218] This view proposes that the idea of Jesus was the Jewish manifestation of Hellenistic mystery cults that acknowledged the non-historic nature of their deity using it instead as a teaching device.^[219] However, the position that Jesus was not a historical figure is essentially without support among biblical scholars and classical historians, most of whom regard its arguments as examples of pseudo-scholarship.^[220]

Scholars and historians such as James H. Charlesworth caution against using parallels with life-death-rebirth gods in the widespread mystery religions prevalent in the Hellenistic culture to conclude that Jesus is a purely legendary figure. Charlesworth argues that 'it would be foolish to continue to foster the illusion that the Gospels are merely fictional stories like the legends of Hercules and Asclepius. The theologies in the New Testament are grounded on interpretations of real historical events…'^[221]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

1. ^Le Roy Froom, Prophetic Faith of Our Fathers , Vol. I, Washington D.C. Review & Herald 1946, p. 328.
2. ^Martin 1991, p. 3–4.
3. ^ ^abMartin 1991, p. 4.
4. ^Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 553–69
5. ^Robert R. Palmer and Joel Colton, A History of the Modern World (New York: McGraw Hill, 1995), pp. 388–92.
6. ^Robert R. Palmer and Joel Colton, A History of the Modern World (New York: McGraw Hill, 1995), p.630.
7. ^Browning, W.R.F. 'Biblical criticism.' A Dictionary of the Bible. 1997 Encyclopedia.com. 8 Apr. 2010
8. ^ ^abRobinson, B.A. Biblical Criticism, including Form Criticism, Tradition Criticism, Higher Criticism, etc. Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, 2008. Web: 8 Apr 2010.
9. ^ ^abMather, G.A. & L.A. Nichols, Dictionary of Cults, Sects, Religions and the Occult, Zondervan (1993) (quoted in Robinson, Biblical Criticism
10. ^Bruce Metzger, cited in The Case for Christ, Lee Strobel
11. ^Ehrman, Bart D. (2005). Misquoting Jesus: The Story Behind Who Changed the Bible and Why. HarperCollins. p. 91. ISBN9780060738174. Retrieved 2 August 2013.
12. ^Ehrman, Bart D. The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture. New York: Oxford U. Press, 1993
13. ^Wallace, Daniel B. 'The Gospel According to Bart: A Review Article of Misquoting Jesus by Bart Ehrman,'Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, June 2006 (also available at Bible.org)
    • Craig L. Blomberg, 'Review of Misquoting Jesus: The Story Behind Who Changed the Bible and Why,'Archived 2009-04-25 at the Wayback Machine Denver Seminary, February 2006
    • Howe, Thomas (2006). 'A Response To Bart D_ Ehrman's Misquoting Jesus'. International Society of Christian Apologetics. p. PDF download. Retrieved 31 July 2013.
14. ^Ehrman, Bart D. (2006). Whose Word Is It?. Continuum International Publishing Group. ISBN978-0-8264-9129-9. p. 166
15. ^Bruce Metzger 'A Textual Commentary on the New Testament', Second Edition, 1994, German Bible Society
16. ^ ^abK. Aland and B. Aland, 'The Text Of The New Testament: An Introduction To The Critical Editions & To The Theory & Practice Of Modern Text Criticism', 1995, op. cit., p. 29-30.
17. ^See for example the list of alleged contradictions from The Skeptic's Annotated Bible and Robert G. Ingersoll's article Inspiration Of Bible.
18. ^M.W.J. Phelan. The Inspiration of the Pentateuch, Two-edged Sword Publications (March 9, 2005) ISBN978-0-9547205-6-8
19. ^Ronald D. Witherup, Biblical Fundamentalism: What Every Catholic Should Know, Liturgical Press (2001), page 26.
20. ^France, R.T., Tyndale New Testament Commentaries: Matthew, Inter-Varsity Press, Leicester, England (1985), pg. 17.
21. ^Britannica Encyclopedia, Jesus Christ, p.17
22. ^ ^abcLindsell, Harold. 'The Battle for the Bible', Zondervan Publishing House, Grand Rapids, Michigan, USA (1976), pg. 38.
23. ^ ^abc'Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy'.
24. ^As in 2 Timothy 3:16, discussed by Thompson, Mark (2006). A Clear and Present Word. New Studies in Biblical Theology. Downers Grove: Apollos. p. 92. ISBN978-1-84474-140-3.
25. ^Norman L. Geisler; William E. Nix (2012), From God To Us Revised and Expanded: How We Got Our Bible, Moody Publishers, p. PT45, ISBN978-0802483928 'faith and practice'
26. ^See notably Grudem, representative of recent scholarship with this emphasis (Grudem, Wayne (1994). Systematic Theology. Nottingham: Inter-Varsity Press. pp. 90–105. ISBN978-0-85110-652-6.).
27. ^Till, Farrell (1991). 'Prophecies: Imaginary and Unfulfilled'. Internet Infidels. Retrieved 2007-01-16.
28. ^W. H. Bellinger; William Reuben Farmer, eds. (1998). Jesus and the Suffering Servant: Isaiah 53 and Christian Origins. Trinity Press. ISBN9781563382307. Retrieved 2 August 2013. Did Jesus of Nazareth live and die without the teaching about the righteous Servant of the Lord in Isaiah 53 having exerted any significant influence on his ministry? Is it probable that this text exerted no significant influence upon Jesus' understanding of the plan of God to save the nations that the prophet Isaiah sets forth?' —Two questions addressed in a conference on 'Isaiah 53 and Christian Origins' at Baylor University in the fall of 1995, the principal papers of which are available in 'Jesus and the Suffering Servant.
29. ^Peter W. Stoner, Science Speaks, Moody Pr, 1958, ISBN0-8024-7630-9
30. ^Harris, Stephen L. (2002). Understanding the Bible (6 ed.). McGraw-Hill College. pp. 376–377. ISBN9780767429160. Retrieved 2 August 2013. (Further snippets of quote: BCD)
31. ^ ^ab'Biography of Isaac ben Abraham of Troki'. Archived from the original on 2007-09-29.
32. ^'TorahLab - Store'.
33. ^Pascal, Blaise (1958). Pensees. Translator W. F. Trotter. chapter x, xii, xiii.
34. ^McDowell, Josh (1999). 'chapter 8'. The New Evidence that Demands a Verdict. Thomas Nelson. ISBN9781850785521.
35. ^ ^ab'English Handbook Page 34 999KB'(PDF).
36. ^See also 'Given the New Testament a Chance?' from the Messiah Truth website
37. ^ ^abDavid Sper, Managing Editor, 'Questions Skeptics Ask About Messianic Prophecies,'Archived 2008-11-20 at the Wayback Machine RBC Ministries, Grand Rapids, MI, 1997
38. ^See Psalms 22:6-8,22:13; 69:8, 69:20-21; Isaiah 11:1, 49:7, 53:2-3,53:8; Daniel 9:26
39. ^Martin 1991, p. 10-12 & 105.
40. ^Martin 1991, p. 111.
41. ^Martin 1991, p. 112.
42. ^Martin 1991, p. 121.
43. ^The NAS New Testament Greek Lexicon
44. ^Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (Oxford University Press 2005 ISBN978-0-19-280290-3), article Virgin Birth of Christ
45. ^See, for example, the Council of Jerusalem described in Acts 15
46. ^Melvin E. Page, Penny M. Sonnenburg (2003). Colonialism: an international, social, cultural, and political encyclopedia, Volume 1. ABC-CLIO. p. 496. Of all religions, Christianity has been most associated with colonialism because several of its forms (Catholicism and Protestantism) were the religions of the European powers engaged in colonial enterprise on a global scale.
47. ^Bevans, Steven. 'Christian Complicity in Colonialism/ Globalism'(PDF). Retrieved 2010-11-17. The modern missionary era was in many ways the ‘religious arm’ of colonialism, whether Portuguese and Spanish colonialism in the sixteenth Century, or British, French, German, Belgian or American colonialism in the nineteenth. This was not all bad — oftentimes missionaries were heroic defenders of the rights of indigenous peoples
48. ^Andrews, Edward (2010). 'Christian Missions and Colonial Empires Reconsidered: A Black Evangelist in West Africa, 1766–1816'. Journal of Church & State. 51 (4): 663–691. doi:10.1093/jcs/csp090. Historians have traditionally looked at Christian missionaries in one of two ways. The first church historians to catalogue missionary history provided hagiographic descriptions of their trials, successes, and sometimes even martyrdom. Missionaries were thus visible saints, exemplars of ideal piety in a sea of persistent savagery. However, by the middle of the twentieth century, an era marked by civil rights movements, anti-colonialism, and growing secularization, missionaries were viewed quite differently. Instead of godly martyrs, historians now described missionaries as arrogant and rapacious imperialists. Christianity became not a saving grace but a monolithic and aggressive force that missionaries imposed upon defiant natives. Indeed, missionaries were now understood as important agents in the ever-expanding nation-state, or “ideological shock troops for colonial invasion whose zealotry blinded them.
49. ^Meador, Jake (2010-09-17). 'Cosmetic Christianity and the Problem of Colonialism – Responding to Brian McLaren'. Retrieved 17 November 2010. According to Jake Meador, 'some Christians have tried to make sense of post-colonial Christianity by renouncing practically everything about the Christianity of the colonizers. They reason that if the colonialists’ understanding of Christianity could be used to justify rape, murder, theft, and empire then their understanding of Christianity is completely wrong.
50. ^Conquistadors, Michael Wood, p. 20, BBC Publications, 2000
51. ^Glenn Sunshine, “Christianity and Slavery,” in True Reason: Confronting the Irrationality of the New Atheism, ed. Tom Gilson and Carson Weitnauer (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2013), 292–293.
52. ^Glancy 2002, p. 141-145.
53. ^Ellerbe 1995, p. 90-92.
54. ^P.G. Kirchschlaeger, 'Slavery and Early Christianity - A reflection from a human rights perspective', Acta theologica. vol.36 suppl.23 Bloemfontein 2016, paragraph 4.3. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/actat.v23i1s.4
55. ^Youval Rotman, Byzantine Slavery and the Mediterranean World, Harvard University Press, 2009, pp 131, 132. Footnotes to Gruszka, Peter. 'Die Ansichten über das Sklaventum in den Schriften ...' Antiquitas 10 (1983): 106-118.
56. ^'Habits of Slavery in Early Christianity'. Brandeis University (in Breton). Retrieved September 17, 2018.
57. ^Youval Rotman, 'Byzantine Slavery and the Mediterranean World', transl. by Jane Marie Todd, Cambridge, Massachusetts – London, Harvard University Press 2009. Book presentation in a) Nikolaos Linardos (University of Athens), , Mediterranean Chronicle 1 (2011) pp. 281, 282, b) Alice Rio, American Historical Review, Vol. 115, Issue 5, 2010, pp. 1513–1514
58. ^ ^abcRobinson, B. A. (2006). 'Christianity and slavery'. Retrieved 2007-01-03.
59. ^Jack D. Forbes (1993), Africans and Native Americans: The Language of Race and the Evolution of Red-Black Peoples, University of Illinois Press, p. 27, ISBN978-0252063213
60. ^Rae, Noel (February 23, 2018). 'How Christian Slaveholders Used the Bible to Justify Slavery'. Time. Retrieved September 18, 2018.
61. ^Rodney Stark, For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science, Witch-Hunts, and the End of SlaveryISBN978-0-691-11436-1 (2003)
62. ^Lamin Sanneh, Abolitionists Abroad: American Blacks and the Making of Modern West Africa, Harvard University Press ISBN978-0-674-00718-5 (2001)
63. ^Ostling, Richard N. (2005-09-17). 'Human slavery: why was it accepted in the Bible?'. Salt Lake City Deseret Morning News. Retrieved 2007-01-03.
64. ^'Abolitionist Movement'. MSN Encyclopedia Encarta. Microsoft. Archived from the original on 2009-10-31. Retrieved 2007-01-03.
65. ^Martin, William. 1996. With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America. New York: Broadway Books.
66. ^Diamond, Sara, 1998. Not by Politics Alone: The Enduring Influence of the Christian Right, New York: Guilford Press, p.213.
67. ^Ortiz, Chris 2007. 'Gary North on D. James Kennedy'Archived 2009-10-11 at the Wayback Machine, Chalcedon Blog, 6 September 2007.
68. ^Ostling, Richard N. (2005-09-17). 'Human slavery: why was it accepted in the Bible?'. Salt Lake City Deseret Morning News. Associated Press. Retrieved 28 October 2014.
69. ^'Civil Rights Movement in the United States'. MSN Encyclopedia Encarta. Microsoft. Archived from the original on 2009-10-31. Retrieved 2007-01-03.
70. ^'Religious Revivalism in the Civil Rights Movement'. African American Review. Winter 2002. Retrieved 2007-01-03.
71. ^'Martin Luther King: The Nobel Peace Prize 1964'. The Nobel Foundation. Retrieved 2006-01-03.
72. ^Thurston, Herbert. St. Joan of Arc. 1910. Catholic Encyclopedia
73. ^Frankenberry, Nancy (1 January 2011). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University – via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
74. ^'The Status of Women in the Old Testament'.
75. ^'The Woman's Bible Index'.
76. ^Clark, Elizabeth. Women in the Early Church. Liturgical Press, 1984. ISBN0-8146-5332-4
77. ^'Jesus Many Faces - Jesus' Family Tree - From Jesus To Christ - FRONTLINE - PBS'.
78. ^ ^ab'King, Karen L. 'Women in Ancient Christianity: the New Discoveries.' Karen L. King is Professor of New Testament Studies and the History of Ancient Christianity at Harvard University in the Divinity School.
79. ^Stagg, Evelyn and Frank. Woman in the World of Jesus. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1978. ISBN0-664-24195-6
80. ^Bilezikian, Gilbert. Beyond Sex Roles (2nd ed.) Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1989, ISBN978-0-8010-0885-6. pp. 82–104
81. ^Schalom Ben-Chorin.Brother Jesus: the Nazarene through Jewish eyes. U of Georgia Press, 2001. ISBN978-0-8203-2256-8, p.66
82. ^Clarke, Arthur C. & Watts, Alan (January), “At the Interface: Technology and Mysticism”, Playboy (Chicago, Ill.: HMH Publishing) 19 (1): 94, ISSN 0032-1478, OCLC 3534353
83. ^Alister McGrath and Joanna Collicutt McGrath, The Dawkins Delusion?,Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2007, ISBN978-0-281-05927-0
84. ^Luke 6
85. ^Peoples, Dr., Glenn Andrew (2012-11-06). 'Whittling down the pacifist narrative: Did early Christians serve in the army?'. www.rightreason.org. Retrieved 7 August 2014.
86. ^1Kings 18:17-46
87. ^Deuteronomy 17:5
88. ^Psalm 18:37
89. ^International encyclopedia of violence research, Volume 2. Springer. 2003. ISBN9781402014666.
90. ^J. Denny Weaver (2001). 'Violence in Christian Theology'. Cross Currents. Retrieved 28 October 2014. '[3rd paragraph] I am using broad definitions of the terms 'violence' and 'nonviolence.' 'Violence' means harm or damage, which obviously includes the direct violence of killing – in war, capital punishment, murder – but also covers the range of forms of systemic violence such as poverty, racism, and sexism. 'Nonviolence' also covers a spectrum of attitudes and actions, from the classic Mennonite idea of passive nonresistance through active nonviolence and nonviolent resistance that would include various kinds of social action, confrontations and posing of alternatives that do not do bodily harm or injury.
91. ^Sam Harris (2006). Letter to a Christian Nation. Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 80–81. ISBN978-0-307-26577-7.
92. ^J. Denny Weaver (2001). 'Violence in Christian Theology'. Cross Currents. Retrieved 2010-10-27.^{[unreliable source?]}
93. ^War, A Catholic Dictionary: Containing some Account of the Doctrine, Discipline, Rites, Ceremonies, Councils, and Religious Orders of the Catholic Church, W. E Addis, T. Arnold, Revised T. B Scannell and P. E Hallett, 15th Edition, Virtue & Co, 1953, Nihil Obstat: Reginaldus Philips, Imprimatur: E. Morrogh Bernard, 2 October 1950, 'In the Name of God : Violence and Destruction in the World's Religions', M. Jordan, 2006, p. 40^{[unreliable source?]}
94. ^Christiansen, Eric. The Northern Crusades. London: Penguin Books. pg. 75.
95. ^Quotation: 'The conflict thesis, at least in its simple form, is now widely perceived as a wholly inadequate intellectual framework within which to construct a sensible and realistic historiography of Western science.' (p. 7), from the essay by Colin A. Russell 'The Conflict Thesis' in Gary Ferngren (editor). Science & Religion: A Historical Introduction. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. ISBN0-8018-7038-0'.
96. ^Quotation: 'In the late Victorian period it was common to write about the 'warfare between science and religion' and to presume that the two bodies of culture must always have been in conflict. However, it is a very long time since these attitudes have been held by historians of science.' (p. 195) Shapin, S. (1996). The Scientific Revolution. University of Chicago Press Chicago, Ill.
97. ^Quotation: 'In its traditional forms, the [conflict] thesis has been largely discredited.' (p. 42) Brooke, J.H. (1991). Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
98. ^Quotation from Ferngren's introduction at 'Gary Ferngren (editor). Science & Religion: A Historical Introduction. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. ISBN0-8018-7038-0.':'…while [John] Brooke's view [of a complexity thesis rather than conflict thesis] has gained widespread acceptance among professional historians of science, the traditional view remains strong elsewhere, not least in the popular mind.' (p. x)
99. ^Gary Ferngren (editor). Science & Religion: A Historical Introduction. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. ISBN0-8018-7038-0. (Introduction, p. ix)
100. ^From Ferngren's introduction:
     '…while [John] Brooke's view [of a complexity thesis rather than conflict thesis] has gained widespread acceptance among professional historians of science, the traditional view remains strong elsewhere, not least in the popular mind. (p. x)-Gary Ferngren, (2002); Introduction, p. ix)
101. ^Sagan, Carl. Cosmos: A Personal Voyage, Episode 3: 'The Harmony of the Worlds'
102. ^quoted in Ted Peters, Science and Religion, Encyclopedia of Religion, p.8182
103. ^The compass in this 13th-century manuscript is a symbol of God's act of Creation.
     * Thomas Woods, How the Catholic Church Built Western Civilization, (Washington, DC: Regenery, 2005), ISBN0-89526-038-7
104. ^Morriston, Wes (2 August 2011). 'Ethical Criticism of the Bible: The Case of Divinely Mandated Genocide'. Sophia. 51 (1): 117–135. doi:10.1007/s11841-011-0261-5.
105. ^Maitzen, Stephen (1 November 2007). 'Skeptical Theism and God's Commands'. Sophia. 46 (3): 237–243. doi:10.1007/s11841-007-0032-5.
106. ^Singer, Peter (1991). A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell Oxford. pp. 91–105.
107. ^See, for example, Everybody's Talkin' About Christian Fascism by Gary Leupp.
108. ^'George Bush and the Rise of Christian Fascism'. Archived from the original on 2008-02-21.
109. ^Chip Berlet, 'Following the Threads,' in Ansell, Amy E. Unraveling the Right: The New Conservatism in American Thought and Politics, pp. 24, Westview Press, 1998, ISBN0-8133-3147-1
110. ^'MPs turn attack back on Cardinal Pell'. Sydney Morning Herald. 2007-06-06.
111. ^'Pope warns Bush on stem cells'. BBC News. 2001-07-23.
112. ^Andrew Dickson, White (1898). A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom. p. X. Theological Opposition to Inoculation, Vaccination, and the Use of Anaesthetics.
113. ^Cathy Lynn Grossman (17 June 2015). 'Americans' confidence in religion hits a new low'. Religion News Service.
114. ^'U.S. has become notably less Christian, major study finds'. LA Times. 12 May 2015.
115. ^About 91% of young outsiders felt Christians were anti-homosexual, 87% felt Christians were judgemental and 85% thought Christians were hypocritical.
116. ^'Millennials Leave Their Churches Over Science, Lesbian & Gay Issues'. Public Religion Research Institute. 10 June 2011.
117. ^http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2007-10-10-christians-young_N.htm
118. ^'America's Change of Mind on Same-Sex Marriage and LGBTQ Rights'. Barna. 3 Jul 2013. Archived from the original on 2013-08-15. Retrieved 2015-06-22.
119. ^See 'About the Evangelical and Ecumenical Women's Caucus'. Archived from the original on July 10, 2011.
120. ^'Home - Christians for Biblical Equality (CBE)'.
121. ^Ronald W. Pierce and Rebecca Merrill Groothuis (eds.). Discovering Biblical Equality: Complementarity without Hierarchy. IVP 2004. p. 17.CS1 maint: Extra text: authors list (link)
122. ^Grudem, Wayne A. 'Should We Move Beyond the New Testament to a Better Ethic?' Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (JETS), 47/2 (June 2004) 299–346
123. ^Eck, Diana L. Encountering God: A Spiritual Journey from Bozeman to Banaras. (2003) p. 98
124. ^ ^abBrumley, Mark. 'Why God is Father and not Mother'. The Catholic Faith Magazine. July/August 1999. Accessed 25 Feb 2013
125. ^ ^ab'Baptist Faith and Message'
126. ^'الاحتفال بعيد انتقال العذراء مريم في سان دييكو'.
127. ^The 9 Most Important Issues Facing the Evangelical Church
128. ^Hume, David (2000). 'Chapter 10. Of Religion'. In Tom L. Beauchamp (ed.). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: A Critical Edition. Volume 3 of The Clarendon edition of the works of David Hume. Oxford University Press. p. 86. ISBN9780198250609. Retrieved 1 August 2013.
129. ^*Homilies of Saint Gregory Palamas, Vol. 1 (ISBN1-878997-67-X) Homilies of Saint Gregory Palamas, Vol. 2 (ISBN187899767X)
130. ^Bruce L. Flamm, MD (2004). 'Inherent Dangers of Faith-Healing Studies'. The Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine. Archived from the original on August 16, 2007.
131. ^'Are Miracles Logically Impossible?'. Come Reason Ministries, Convincing Christianity. Retrieved 2007-11-21.
132. ^''Miracles are not possible,' some claim. Is this true?'. ChristianAnswers.net. Retrieved 2007-11-21.
133. ^Paul K. Hoffman. 'A Jurisprudential Analysis Of Hume's 'in Principal' Argument Against Miracles'(PDF). Christian Apologetics Journal, Volume 2, No. 1, Spring, 1999; Copyright ©1999 by Southern Evangelical Seminary. Archived from the original(PDF) on October 26, 2007. Retrieved 2007-11-21.
134. ^Howard W. Clarke, The Gospel of Matthew and Its Readers, Indiana University Press, 2003, p. 12
135. ^William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, Crossway Books (1994) pages 38-39.
136. ^'Let no cultured person draw near, none wise and none sensible, for all that kind of thing we count evil; but if any man is ignorant, if any man is wanting in sense and culture, if anybody is a fool, let him come boldly [to become a Christian]. Celsus, AD178
137. ^'Since we all inherit Adam's sin, we all deserve eternal damnation. All who die unbaptized, even infants, will go to hell and suffer unending torment. We have no reason to complain of this, since we are all wicked. (In the Confessions, the Saint enumerates the crimes of which he was guilty in the cradle.) But by God's free grace certain people, among those who have been baptized, are chosen to go to heaven; these are the elect. They do not go to heaven because they are good; we are all totally depraved, except insofar as God's grace, which is only bestowed on the elect, enables us to be otherwise. No reason can be given why some are saved and the rest damned; this is due to God's unmotivated choice. Damnation proves God's justice; salvation His mercy. Both equally display His goodness.' A history of Western Philosophy by Bertrand Russell, Simon & Schuster, 1945
138. ^Bible Teaching and Religious Practice essay: 'Europe and Elsewhere,' Mark Twain, 1923)
139. ^Albert Einstein, Out of My Later Years (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), p. 27
140. ^'Archived copy'. Archived from the original on 2002-09-01. Retrieved 2008-09-15.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)
141. ^Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1035, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, ISBN0-89243-565-8,1994-the revised version issued 1997 has no changes in this section
142. ^Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1033, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, ISBN0-89243-565-8,1994
143. ^Richard Beck. 'Christ and Horrors, Part 3: Horror Defeat, Universalism, and God's Reputation'. Experimental Theology. March 19, 2007.
144. ^Jonathan Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell, New York: Oxford University Press, ISBN978-0-19-508487-0, 1993
145. ^'The Works of Thomas Manton', by Thomas Manton, p. 99
146. ^''A Tender Age': Chapter 2'.
147. ^Canon Law 1983
148. ^ ^ab'Archived copy'. Archived from the original on 2007-05-08. Retrieved 2008-01-22.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)
149. ^n:Vatican abolishes Limbo
150. ^Catechism of the Catholic Church. New York: Doubleday. 1994. p. 845. ISBN978-0-385-47967-7.
151. ^Limbo: Recent statements by the Catholic church; Protestant views on Limbo at Religioustolerance.org
152. ^'Root of All Evil?'. 9 January 2006 – via IMDb.
153. ^McGrath, Alister (2004). Dawkins' God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life. Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishing. p. 81. ISBN978-1-4051-2538-3.
154. ^Dawkins, Richard (September 17, 2007). 'Do you have to read up on leprechology before disbelieving in them?'. RichardDawkins.net. Retrieved 2007-11-14.
155. ^Marianna Krejci-Papa, 2005. 'Taking On Dawkins' God:An interview with Alister McGrathArchived 2015-02-07 at the Wayback Machine.' Science & Theology News, 2005–04–25.
156. ^Dinesh D'Souza, What's So Great About Christianity, Regnery Publishing, ISBN1-59698-517-8 (2007)
157. ^Andrew Wilson, Deluded by Dawkins?, Kingsway Publications, ISBN978-1-84291-355-0 (2007)
158. ^'Ingersoll Biography: Chapter XI'.
159. ^Brandt, Eric T., and Timothy Larsen (2011). 'The Old Atheism Revisited: Robert G. Ingersoll and the Bible'. Journal of the Historical Society. 11 (2): 211–238. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5923.2011.00330.x.
160. ^More Than A Carpenter, Tyndale House, Wheaton, Illinois, 1977, ISBN978-0-8423-4552-1
161. ^Jeffery, Steve; Ovey, Michael; Sach, Andrew (2007). Pierced for our transgressions. Nottingham: Inter-Varsity Press. ch. 13. ISBN978-1-84474-178-6.
162. ^Most notably, Matthew 10:22-23, 16:27-28, 23:36, 24:29-34, 26:62-64; Mark 9:1, 14:24-30, 14:60-62; and Luke 9:27
163. ^In his famous essay Why I Am Not a Christian
164. ^Dr. Knox Chamblin, Professor of New Testament Emeritus, Columbia Theological Seminary: Commentary on Matthew 16:21-28 - see last 4 paragraphs
165. ^Theodor Zahn, F.F. Bruce, J. Barton Payne, etc. hold this opinion - What is the meaning of Matthew 10:23?
166. ^ ^abFrom Witchcraft to Justice: Death and Afterlife in the Old Testament, George E. Mendenhall.
167. ^ ^abHiroshi Obayashi, Death and Afterlife: Perspectives of World Religions. See Introduction.
168. ^Jewish eschatology#Olam Haba - the afterlife and the world to come Jewish eschatology: The afterlife and olam haba
169. ^Acts 23:6-8
170. ^Pharisees#Pharisaic principles and values Pharisees: Pharisaic Principles and Values
171. ^Essenes#Rules, customs, theology and beliefs Essenes: Rules, customs, theology and beliefs
172. ^Gaudium et spes, 19
173. ^ ^ab'The Evangelical Scandal'.
174. ^'Marriage 103: The Raw Reality of Divorce and its Terrible Results'. Archived from the original on 2008-03-27. Retrieved 2008-01-22.
175. ^In his book 'Glimpses of world history', p. 86-87
176. ^'Secularism and Hindutva, a Discursive Study', by A. A. Parvathy, p.42
177. ^As quoted by William Rees-Mogg 4 April 2005 edition of The Times. Gandhi here makes reference to a statement of Jesus: “No servant can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will be loyal to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon.' (Luke 16:13)
178. ^Schopenhauer, Arthur; trans. T. Bailey Saunders. 'Religion: A Dialogue'. The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer.
179. ^see e.g.: John Coffey, Persecution and Toleration on Protestant England 1558-1689, 2000, p. 206.
180. ^see e.g.: John Coffey, Persecution and Toleration on Protestant England 1558-1689, 2000, p.22
181. ^*Lutz E. von Padberg (1998), Die Christianisierung Europas im Mitterlalter, Reclam (in German), p. 183
182. ^ ^abcdIan Kershaw; Hitler a Biography; 2008 Edn; WW Norton & Company; London; p.381-382
183. ^ ^abAlan Bullock; Hitler: A Study in Tyranny; HarperPerennial Edition 1991; p219
184. ^William L. Shirer (1960). The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. London: Secker & Warburg. pp. 238–39.
185. ^Robert Michael; Philip Rosen (2007). Dictionary of Antisemitism from the Earliest Times to the Present. Lanham: Scarecrow Press. p. 321. ISBN9780810858688.
186. ^Ian Kershaw; The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation; 4th Edn; Oxford University Press; New York; 2000'; pp. 173–74
187. ^ ^abEncyclopedia Britannica Online: Fascism - Identification with Christianity; 2013. Web. 14 Apr. 2013
188. ^'American Experience . The Man Behind Hitler . Transcript - PBS'.
189. ^Encyclopedia Britannica Online - Martin Bormann; web 25 April 2013
190. ^Encyclopedia Britannica Online - Alfred Rosenberg; web 25 April 2013.
191. ^Alan Bullock; Hitler: A Study in Tyranny; HarperPerennial Edition 1991; p219'
192. ^Ian Kershaw; Hitler a Biography; 2008 Edn; WW Norton & Company; London; p.295-297
193. ^Encyclopedia Britannica Online - Martin Niemöller; web 24 April 2013
194. ^Encyclopedia Britannica Online - Dietrich Bonhoeffer; web 25 April 2013
195. ^Hoover 2015, p. 23: According to Hoover Linda '...Castelli (2007) believed the reluctance to self-disclose could be the “Christian persecution complex” (p. 156), an ideology that Christian values are unfavorably targeted by social and governmental opposition...'
196. ^Årsheim 2016, p. 7:According to Elizabeth Castelli, this engagement can be ascribed to a ‘Christian persecution complex’ that gathered pace throughout the 1990s, with the adoption of the US International Religious Freedom Act in 1998 as a significant milestone, and with the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 as an accelerating factor (Castelli 2007: 173). This complex “…mobilizes the language of religious persecution to shut down political debate and critique by characterizing any position not in alignment with this politicized version of Christianity as an example of anti-religious bigotry and persecution. Moreover, it routinely deploys the archetypal figure of the martyr as a source of unquestioned religious and political authority.” (Castelli 2007: 154).
197. ^Ben-Asher 2017, p. 22: «...The notion that Christianity is under attack is prevalent in contemporary arguments for religious exemptions. Conservative legislatures, politicians and the media frequently characterize issues such as same-sex marriage and the ACA’s Contraceptives Mandate as attacks on Christians or Christianity....
198. ^'Professor Candida Moss'. birmingham.ac.uk. Retrieved 2018-02-21.
199. ^Janes & Houen 2014, p. 24: Indeed, a recent study by Candida Moss, The Myth of Persecution]] has suggested that Christian 'persecution complex' was the result of internal christian identity politics
200. ^'Dr Paul Cavill'. hist.cam.ac.uk. Retrieved 2018-02-27.
201. ^Cavil 2013, p. 81: The early christian persecution complex is often underemphasised, but is important. The New Testament teaches that persecution is the inevitable by-product of effective Christianity
202. ^'Raja Rammohun Roy: Encounter with Islam and Christianity and the Articulation of Hindu Self-Consciousness. Page 166, by Abidullah Al-Ansari Ghazi, year = 2010
203. ^'Raja Rammohun Roy: Encounter with Islam and Christianity and the Articulation of Hindu Self-Consciousness. Page 169, by Abidullah Al-Ansari Ghazi, year = 2010
204. ^'Neo-Hindu Views of Christianity', p. 96, by Arvind Sharma, year = 1988
205. ^'Gandhi on Pluralism and Communalism', by P. L. John Panicker, p.39, year = 2006
206. ^'Dayānanda Sarasvatī, his life and ideas', p. 267, by J. T. F. Jordens
207. ^ ^abChapter 6 Hindutva, Secular India and the Report of the Christian Missionary Activities Enquiry Committee: 1954-57 Sebastian C.H. Kim, in Nationalism and Hindutva: A Christian Response: Papers from the 10th CMS Consultation, Mark T. B. Laing, 2005 ISBN9788172148386
208. ^ ^abcdPentecostals, Proselytization, and Anti-Christian Violence in Contemporary India by Chad M. Bauman, Oxford University Press, 2015
209. ^ ^abThe Debate on Conversion Initiated by the Sangh Parivar, 1998-1999 Author: Sebastian Kim, Source: Transformation, Vol. 22, No. 4, Christianity and Religions (October 2005), pp. 224- 237
210. ^Dr. Timothy Hembrom. Book review on 'Arun Shourie and his Christian Critic' and on S.R. Goel, Catholic Ashrams, in the Indian Journal of Theology 'Book Reviews,' Indian Journal of Theology 37.2 (1995): 93-99.
211. ^The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, by Paul Arthur Schilpp, page = 641
212. ^'Judaism and Other Religions', p. 88, publisher = Palgrave Macmillan
213. ^Anti-Judaism and Early Christian Identity: A Critique of the Scholarly Consensus, by Miriam S. Taylor, p. 41
214. ^'Idolatry', by Moshe Halbertal, p. 212
215. ^Wise Criticizes Christian World for Failure to Rescue Jews in Nazi Europe 19 February 1943
216. ^'At-Tawba, Al Qu'ran'. University of Leeds. Retrieved 5 February 2017.
217. ^Christianity: An Introduction, p. 125, by Alister E. McGrath
218. ^Examples of authors who argue the Jesus myth theory: Thomas L. ThompsonThe Messiah Myth: The Near Eastern Roots of Jesus and David (Jonathan Cape, Publisher, 2006); Michael Martin, The Case Against Christianity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 36–72; John Mackinnon Robertson
219. ^Freke, Timothy and Gandy, Peter (1999) The Jesus Mysteries. London: Thorsons (Harper Collins)
220. ^Historian Michael Grant stated, 'To sum up, modern critical methods fail to support the Christ myth theory. It has 'again and again been answered and annihilated by first rank scholars.' In recent years, 'no serious scholar has ventured to postulate the non historicity of Jesus' or at any rate very few, and they have not succeeded in disposing of the much stronger, indeed very abundant, evidence to the contrary.' —Michael Grant, Jesus: An Historian's Review of the Gospels (Scribner, 1995).
     • 'There are those who argue that Jesus is a figment of the Church’s imagination, that there never was a Jesus at all. I have to say that I do not know any respectable critical scholar who says that any more.' —Burridge, R & Gould, G, Jesus Now and Then, Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2004, p.34.
     • Michael James McClymond, Familiar Stranger: An Introduction to Jesus of Nazareth, Eerdrmans (2004), page 24: 'most scholars regard the argument for Jesus' non-existence as unworthy of any response'.
221. ^Charlesworth, James H. (ed.) (2006). Jesus and Archaeology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. ISBN978-0-8028-4880-2.CS1 maint: Extra text: authors list (link)

Sources[edit]

• Ellerbe, Helen (1995). The Dark Side of Christian History. Morningstar Books. ISBN978-0-9644873-4-5.
• Glancy, Jennifer A. (2002). Slavery in Early Christianity. Oxford University Press. ISBN978-1-4514-1094-5.
• Martin, Michael (1991). The Case Against Christianity. Temple University Press. ISBN978-1-56639-081-1.

Further reading[edit]

Skeptical of Christianity[edit]

• A Rationalist Encyclopaedia: A book of reference on religion, philosophy, ethics and science,Gryphon Books (1971).
• Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, by Daniel Dennett
• Civilization and its discontents, by Sigmund Freud
• Death and Afterlife, Perspectives of World Religions, by Hiroshi Obayashi
• Einstein and Religion, by Max Jammer
• From Jesus to Christianity, by L. Michael White
• Future of an illusion, by Sigmund Freud
• Harvesting our souls: Missionaries, their design, their claims. by Shourie, Arun. (2006). New Delhi: Rupa.
• History of Hindu-Christian encounters, AD 304 to 1996. by Goel, Sita Ram. 2016.
• Hindu view of Christianity and Islam. by Swarup, Ram (1992).
• Letter to a Christian Nation, by Sam Harris
• Light of truth : Or an English translation of the Satyarth Prakash. Dayananda, S., & Bharadwaja, C. (1915). Allahabad: Arya Pratinidhi Sabha.
• Misquoting Jesus: The Story Behind Who Changed the Bible and Why, by Bart Ehrman
• Missionaries in India: Continuities, changes, dilemmas. Shourie, Arun. (2006). New Delhi: Rupa.
• Out of my later years and the World as I see it, by Albert Einstein
• Russell on Religion, by Louis Greenspan (Includes most all of Russell's essays on religion)
• The Antichrist, by Friedrich Nietzsche
• The God Delusion, by Richard Dawkins
• God Is Not Great by Christopher Hitchens
• The Varieties of Scientific Experience: A Personal View of the Search for God, by Carl Sagan
• Understanding the Bible, by Stephen L Harris
• Where God and Science Meet [Three Volumes]: How Brain and Evolutionary Studies Alter Our Understanding of Religion, by Patrick McNamara
• Why I am not a Christian and other essays, by Bertrand Russell
• Why I Became an Atheist: A Former Preacher Rejects Christianity, by John W. Loftus (Prometheus Books, 2008)
• The Christian Delusion, edited by John W. Loftus, foreword by Dan Barker (Prometheus Books, 2010)
• Christian Missionary Activities Enquiry Committee (Madhya Pradesh, India), and Sita Ram Goel. 1998. Vindicated by time: the Niyogi Committee report on Christian missionary activities. New Delhi: Voice of India.
• The End of Christianity, edited by John W. Loftus (Prometheus Books, 2011)
• The Historical Evidence for Jesus, by G. A. Wells (Prometheus Books, 1988)
• The Jesus Puzzle, by Earl Doherty (Age of Reason Publications, 1999)
• The encyclopedia of Biblical errancy, by C. Dennis McKinsey (Prometheus Books, 1995)
• godless, by Dan Barker (Ulysses Press 2008)
• The Jesus Mysteries by Timothy Freke and Peter Gandy (Element 1999)
• The reason driven life by Robert M. Price (Prometheus Books, 2006)
• The Case Against Christianity by Michael Martin
• The case against the case for Christ by Robert M. Price (American atheist press 2010)
• God, the failed hypothesis by Victor J. Stenger (Prometheus Books, 2007)
• Jesus never existed by Kenneth Humphreys (Iconoclast Press, 2005)

Issues And Arguments

Defending Christianity[edit]

• 'The Jury Returns: A Juridical Defense of Christianity' by John Warwick Montgomery. An Excerpt from 'Evidence for Faith' Chapter 6, Part 2 https://web.archive.org/web/20071201174627/http://www.mtio.com/articles/bissart1.htm
• 'The Infidel Delusion' by Patrick Chan, Jason Engwer, Steve Hays, and Paul Manata https://web.archive.org/web/20120112123105/http://www.calvindude.com/ebooks/InfidelDelusion.pdf
• Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable Enemies, by David Bentley Hart
• Dethroning Jesus, by Darrell Bock, Daniel B. Wallace
• Jesus Among Other Gods, by Ravi Zacharias
• Mere Christianity, by C. S. Lewis
• Orthodoxy, by G. K. Chesterton
• Reasonable Faith, by William Lane Craig
• Reinventing Jesus, by J. Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, Daniel B. Wallace
• The Case for Christ, by Lee Strobel
• The Dawkins Letters, by David Robertson
• The Reason For God, by Timothy J Keller

Feminism Issues And Arguments